




HANDBOOK

No. 04-27

Volume II

Nov 04

Convoy Leader Training



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Preface

This handbook provides a field guide for convoy leaders conducting transport operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and focuses on planning and preparing for combat to counter Level I and II threats. This handbook is based on doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) found in the references listed below and on experience gained from units participating in OIF. Request any additional suggested threat or friendly TTP be sent to mpri@kuwait.army.mil. All comments will be reviewed for future changes. **CALL Handbook 04-27, *Convoy Leader Training***, Volume II supercedes all previous CFLCC versions of Convoy Leader Training.

References

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- "The Road Warrior": Unclassified daily updates on the main supply routes (MSRs) in Iraq prepared by the 375th Transportation Group intelligence section.

Various after action reports from units conducting tactical convoys in Iraq.

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Chapter 1

Convoy Troop Leading Procedures

1-1. General. Convoys conducted on the modern asymmetrical battlefield are combat operations. While their purpose may be to deliver people or supplies from one point to another, the convoy planner must assume that his convoy will encounter enemy attempts to disrupt movement or inflict damage and casualties. Every unit executing convoys in Iraq has learned and emphasizes the importance of maintaining a combat posture from start point (SP) to release point (RP). Every Soldier in the convoy must be in full uniform and maintain an aggressive vigilance. Poorly disciplined convoys become a target. Therefore, a convoy should be planned and prepared using the same troop leading procedures (TLPs) used in any combat arms operation. These TLPs have been proven in combat to provide leaders with detailed and effective procedures for developing, issuing, and preparing for a sound tactical plan. Using TLPs will ensure that all key tasks are accomplished, making maximum use of the leader's most critical resource, time. While TLPs are standardized throughout the Army, this chapter will discuss how they are tailored to specifically fit convoy operations.

1-2. Convoy TLPs.

- Receive the mission
- Issue the warning order (WARNO)
- Make a tentative plan
- Initiate movement
- Reconnoiter
- Complete the plan
- Issue the convoy brief
- Supervise

1-2.1. Receive the Mission. The convoy commander may receive the mission in a WARNO; an operations order (OPORD); fragmentary order (FRAGO); transportation movement request (TMR); or verbally, if time is short.

- The convoy commander should ensure he completely understands the mission and tasks involved. He takes this opportunity to ask clarifying questions and seek further guidance if necessary.
- The convoy commander should then quickly analyze his unit's current capability to accomplish the assigned task. "See yourself" means making a rapid assessment of any problems (people, supplies, or maintenance) that could jeopardize the mission. If the issues are serious enough to require assistance from the commander, he should be informed immediately.

1-2.2. Issue the WARNO. WARNOs are issued to ensure that subordinate leaders of elements have key information they need to maximize their preparation time. Typically, convoy operations are planned in a time-constrained environment. The initial WARNO should include a manifest and time line. The manifest provides the detailed organization for combat: formation, personnel, and equipment. The time line is a schedule of all preparatory tasks from receipt of the mission to SP. The convoy commander may issue multiple WARNOs as he receives additional

information or changes from higher. A fill-in-the-blank WARNO, along with implementing guidance, is provided in Appendices A, B, and C.

1-2.3. Make a Tentative Plan. A simplified approach to tactical analysis and planning makes use of the following basic considerations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

- **Mission.** The convoy commander must review, then plan to execute all of the tasks and guidance found in his higher operational instructions and commanders' intent. Essential or priority tasks should be determined. Any restrictions or limitations (detours, restricted routes, rules of engagement [ROE]) must be considered and applied).
- **Enemy.** Convoys are generally conducted in familiar areas (continuous operations in assigned areas of operation [AOs]). This permits units to develop detailed records of historical information concerning enemy activity along frequently traveled routes. A pattern analysis of intelligence is necessary for understanding and reacting to the threat(s). All leaders and personnel of units conducting convoys must be thoroughly knowledgeable and current on the threats they face. Units that have Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) can use this system to obtain a current threat common operating picture (COP).

- **Types of threats to convoys.**

- Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- Level I and II ambush (may be combined with or initiated by IED/VBIED)
- Mines
- Snipers/small arms fire
- Rocket propelled grenade (RPG)

- **Threat analysis.** Each type of threat should be further analyzed to be fully understood.

- Capability: Weapon(s)/device(s) and effective range
- Organization/Strength
- Times
- Location: A continuous pattern analysis of historical contacts along frequently scheduled routes provides excellent indications where increased patrolling between convoys and increased vigilance during convoys must occur.
- Photographs and diagrams provide leaders and Soldiers with an ability to visualize the threat.

- **Unit intelligence responsibilities.** Units must actively record and analyze the threats in their AO. Relying solely on intelligence from the battalion S-2's analysis is only a starting point. Convoys that see routes on a daily basis and are debriefed regularly will provide much more detailed information. Tasking an operations

noncommissioned officer (NCO) at the company level to provide this intelligence support to convoy commanders will ensure that detailed and current intelligence is disseminated to the individuals who must face the threats. Recommendations include:

Developing route-specific battle books that focus on the actual threat(s) and pattern analysis being employed along frequently traveled routes

Threat “hot spots” should be further identified on the strip map(s) issued to convoys.

Conduct regular briefings for leaders and Soldiers to become thoroughly familiar with the threat in the area of operation (AO). This cannot be accomplished solely during convoy briefings.

Tactical risk management begins here. Based on what they know about the specific threat, unit leaders should identify the hazards and implement control measures to lower the risks.

Focus rehearsals on the most likely threat.

- **Terrain and weather.**

- **Terrain.** Normally leaders focus on the standard military aspects of terrain for combat operations, OCOKA:

- **Observation/Fields of fire**
- **Cover and concealment**
- **Obstacles**
- **Key terrain**
- **Avenues of approach**

While this traditional approach is occasionally necessary during convoy operations, the primary focus should be the route.

This analysis cannot be accomplished using only a map. Combat imagery base (CIB) products and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery available through battalion S-2 imagery channels are additional tools, but nothing replaces a thorough ground reconnaissance. Take detailed notes pertaining to navigation, trafficability, congestion, and the threat. The primary method for providing information to convoy leaders concerning the route is the strip map. These sketches are easily developed, refined, and produced. Strip maps for long haul routes should be constructed at high levels of command, but maps for local short haul routes are ideally produced at battalion or lower levels. Appendix E provides a detailed example and discussion of information that should be included on a strip map. These maps should be issued to every vehicle in the convoy.

- **Weather.** Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable. The effects of weather should be factored in during the review of the terrain. In this sub-step, weather analysis evaluates the weather’s direct effects on a convoy’s operation. The military aspects of weather include:

Visibility
 Winds
 Precipitation
 Cloud cover
 Temperature
 Humidity

- **Light data.** The following information concerning light data should be collected and reviewed prior to each operation. The effects of light could provide advantages to the threat.

Beginning (of) morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and end (of) evening nautical twilight (EENT) is defined as the first and last time of the day that an individual Soldier can engage a target at the maximum effective range of his weapon system unaided.

Percentage of illumination is defined as the percentage of illumination present based on the moon. An example would be ¼ moon is 25%, ½ moon is 50%, and full moon is 100%. In order to analyze illumination, there is also a requirement to understand moon-rise (MR) and moon-set (MS). During the hours of darkness, before the moon rises and after the moon sets, percentage of illumination is 0%.

- **Troops and support available.** Here the convoy commander again attempts to “see yourself” by analyzing the positive or negative affects of the factors listed below. Any limitations noted result in increased risks for the convoy and should be mitigated during the preparation or execution phase.

Troops	Equipment
Rest/Morale	Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) feedback
Mission/Route experience	Hardening versus enemy risk
Convoy training	Weapon maintenance
Convoy weapon employment experience	Ammunition available
Gun truck/Security experience	Pyrotechnics available
Tasked training/Experience	Communication systems

- **Time available.** See discussion of time line in Appendix C.
- **Civil considerations.** Heavy civilian presence in operational areas will be a major complicating factor along any convoy route. The potential interference may vary when considering the following types of potential civilian activity:
 - Active insurgents
 - Criminals (pilferage/theft)
 - Sympathizers (non-lethal harassment such as children throwing rocks)
 - Unwilling accomplices
 - Innocent bystanders
 - Vehicle traffic
 - Legitimate armed police/militia
 - Civilian/government property

Reconnaissance of routes can identify where this activity may be most prevalent or dangerous. Historical data on problem areas should be collected, recorded, and used to develop methods of avoiding civilian casualties and damage to private property. A concerted effort must be made to ensure that all Soldiers understand applicable Laws of War (LOW) and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) rules for use of force, particularly for use of deadly force. CFLCC rules of engagement (ROE) emphasizes four broad principles:

- Attack enemy forces and military targets
- Spare civilians and civilian property, if possible
- Conduct yourself with dignity and honor
- Comply with the LOW; if you see a violation, report it.

Additional classes should be conducted within the unit to foster a detailed understanding of the LOW and CFLCC rules for use of force. Appendix H provides a discussion of LOW, the CFLCC ROE and a series of vignettes recently used by the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad, Iraq. Convoy planners must emphasize these requirements during every convoy briefing.

A decision to engage is a decision that must be made by individual Soldiers. The principles and vignettes previously indicated provide a general understanding of when to shoot. When faced with hostile action on the move in close proximity to innocent civilians, an individual decision to shoot should be based on a rapid analysis of two factors:

- Risk to yourself and convoy

HIGH risk to yourself or convoy: Sniper or RPG gunner aiming or shooting a weapon within 100 meters and surrounded by civilians

LOW risk to yourself or convoy: Individual aiming a rifle at a distance greater than 100 meters surrounded by civilians

- Your ability to hit an enemy threat without endangering civilians in the area

HIGH probability of hit: You are stationary or moving slowly; there is a clear path to the enemy threat

LOW probability of hit: You are moving rapidly; your enemy threat is in close proximity of innocent civilians

If risk to yourself or convoy is HIGH and your probability of hitting the enemy threat is HIGH, engage the target. If the risk to yourself or convoy is LOW and the probability of hitting the enemy threat is LOW, do not engage the target.

1.2.4 Initiate Movement. During the preparation period it may be necessary to move elements of the convoy for refueling, rearming, or to pickup loads. The convoy should schedule these moves in the time line and delegate execution to subordinate leaders so that convoy planning is not disrupted.

1.2.5 Conduct Reconnaissance. There are four types of reconnaissance (recon) that may be conducted:

- Map
- Ground (physical)
- Aerial
- Imagery

One purpose of a recon is to confirm or deny the results of the enemy and terrain analysis in relation to the actual route. The ground, aerial, and imagery recons are the optimal methods to do this. Ground recons need to be planned as a separate mission and must include a security element. Imagery recons are an excellent method to obtain information regarding specific areas of interest, such as known enemy "hot spots" or areas that may slow or restrict movement, thereby increasing the threat environment for a convoy.

1.2.6 Complete the Plan. All convoy briefings are verbal orders; however, a number of planning products should be completed and used during the briefing. Examples of each with preparation guidance are listed below.

- Appendix B: Manifest
- Appendix C: Time Line
- Appendix E: Strip Map
- Appendix F: Convoy Briefing Format (5 paragraph convoy order)
- Appendix I:
 - Convoy Commander Risk Management Card
 - Risk Reduction Worksheet

1.2.7 Issue the Operations Order (Convoy Brief). Determine a site conducive to giving an order for a combat operation and properly set up for the convoy brief. This site should support the use of multiple visual aids such as charts, map blow-ups, and a whiteboard/butcher paper board. The convoy commander must prepare carefully and rehearse the presentation. Subordinate leaders should give a

backbrief/confirmation brief to the commander at the conclusion of all convoy orders.

1.2.8 Supervise Execution. Every aspect of preparation for a convoy should be supervised. The convoy commander and assistant convoy commander cannot accomplish this without the assistance of all subordinate leaders and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Each truck commander in a convoy serial should be considered part of the convoy chain of command. With limited planning and preparation time, which is often the situation, effective pre-combat checks (PCC)/pre-combat inspections (PCI) and individual/crew rehearsals will only occur when these individuals are held responsible. When the time line is developed, plan and schedule how and when to delegate key supervisory tasks.

Chapter 2

Convoy Task Organization

2-1. General. Convoys are planned to organize and control road movements including the tactical movement of combat forces; tactical movement of logistics units; and movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment to support forces in combat. For the purpose of this discussion, a convoy is a group of vehicles (2 to 20 vehicles) organized under a single commander/leader for one of the purposes stated above. There is no intent to cover administrative convoy procedures (loads, routes, or activities at the destination). The considerations provided in this chapter pertain to organizing for combat. Once the organization of the convoy has been decided, that organization becomes the convoy manifest (see Appendix B).

2-2. Key Personnel/Teams and Functions/Locations. All of the personnel and team functions described here pertain to any size convoy. Depending on the number of vehicles involved, multiple duties may be performed by a single vehicle crew.

- **Convoy commander (CC):** The CC is the single leader responsible for the planning, preparation, and execution of a convoy. The CC will normally position himself about center sector of the main body formation, but is free to travel or move to any location that will enhance his ability to command and control the convoy.
- **Assistant convoy commander (ACC):** The ACC is second-in-charge and responsible for logistical support of the convoy during preparation and execution. In coordination with the CC, the ACC will ensure that all classes of supply are planned for and issued; that maintenance of vehicles, communications, weapons, and other key equipment is checked; and that medical preparations to treat and evacuate casualties are accomplished. During convoy execution, the ACC will be in charge of the rear element, monitoring rear security, and overwatching the trail elements of the convoy. He will assist the CC in controlling the rear gun truck, if one is assigned. He will direct casualty treatment and evacuation teams and will supervise recovery operations.
- **Lead vehicle commander (LVC):** The LVC is responsible for navigation, speed, and interval of the convoy based on the guidance in the convoy brief and the situation on the ground. He should be an experienced leader, with excellent Global Positioning System (GPS) and land navigation skills, who is familiar with the route. He will be in charge of the forward element monitoring forward security. He will assist the CC in controlling the lead gun truck, if one is assigned.
- **Gun trucks:** The gun truck provides security to the convoy during movement and at halts. There are several versions of gun trucks; however, they all should be hardened to provide extra protection to both crew and gunner, be highly maneuverable, and have a stable mounted automatic weapon system with the ability to traverse 360 degrees. In high threat areas, a unit should attempt to provide a gun truck for every five vehicles. In a 20-vehicle convoy, this would provide lead and trail gun trucks with two gun trucks to move up and down the convoy keeping civilian traffic out of the formation. The gun trucks also move to

intersections/roundabouts to stop civilian traffic.

- **Combat life savers (CLSs)/medics:** The CLSs/medics are responsible for rendering medical treatment and supervising evacuation of casualties. If possible, multiple CLSs should be assigned, dispersing assets throughout the convoy and assigning them responsibility for designated vehicles in order to speed medical attention. If limited, CLS assets should always be positioned in the rear of the formation in order to better support contacts anywhere in the convoy.
- **Aid and litter (A&L) team:** The A&L teams of two to four Soldiers each are responsible for providing buddy aid and preparing casualties for movement and/or evacuation under supervision of the CLS. If possible, multiple teams should be assigned, dispersing assets throughout the convoy and assigning them responsibility for designated vehicles in order to speed medical assistance. If limited, teams should always be positioned in the rear of the formation in order to better support the CLS. CLS personnel should not be assigned to an A&L team. CLS personnel should focus on treatment.
- **Landing zone (LZ) team:** The LZ team is responsible for selecting, securing, clearing, establishing, and marking the LZ site. If possible, assign an alternate team.
- **Recovery team:** A vehicle(s) should be designated to assist with maintenance and recovery along the route. Ideally it would be a wheeled maintenance and recovery vehicle with maintenance trained personnel as driver/truck commander (TC). If that is not possible, the vehicle should be capable of towing any vehicle in the convoy and be equipped with chains, tow cables, and tools that may be required to provide minor repairs and recovery. The personnel assigned to this vehicle should have practiced hasty recovery prior to start point (SP). This vehicle is normally the next to last vehicle in the convoy if there is a rear gun truck. If it is the last vehicle, it must have a rear guard with an automatic weapon to provide protection to the rear of the convoy.

2-3 Convoy Organization/Order of March: Convoys are generally organized into three elements: the lead, main body, and trail. The lead element consists of the lead gun truck(s) and the LVC. The main body consists of the majority of the vehicles in the convoy with the CC traveling center sector in this element. Petroleum or ammunition vehicles should be separated throughout this element. Heavier and slower vehicles should be forward in the main body to assist in gauging/maintaining convoy speeds. For large convoys, multiple CLS/A&L teams and additional gun trucks should be dispersed throughout this element. The trail element consists of CLS/A&L team, the recovery vehicle, the ACC, and the rear gun truck. How key personnel and teams might be organized in an order of march for 4, 8, and 20 vehicle convoys is illustrated below:




Figure 2-1

Chapter 3

Battle Drills/Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)

SECTION ONE: Vehicle Battle Drills

3-1-1. Driver Side Contact Drill. A driver must continuously scan and remain alert for threats within his sector of scan (9 to 1 o'clock position) by observing driver side, passenger side, and rearview mirrors. Early threat identification will allow the driver to more quickly place direct fire on the threat within his/her sector of fire (9 to 1 o'clock position) using the following weapon engagement techniques and procedures.

The driver's method of engagement will be reflexive fire trained during close quarters marksmanship (CQM). However, the weapon is pointed, not aimed, because the driver's primary task is controlling the vehicle. The weapon is best handled like a pistol. The right hand is controlling weapon movement and elevation by allowing the upper receiver to pivot on the driver's left arm. The weapon's rate of fire will be on semi-automatic with rapid trigger squeezes. This rate of fire is recommended, as firing on burst will cause the weapon's muzzle to rise up and become uncontrollable.

Drill 1:

This drill begins with the driver's weapon stored in its proper location in the cab (unit standing operating procedures [SOP] based on type of vehicle). The type of vehicle and physical size of the driver and truck commander (TC) will have a significant impact on this battle drill, as the weapon is passed between both. Bottom line is to ensure that weapons are on safe, that positive control is maintained for each weapon, and that vocal commands are understood.

Note: M249s/M203s are not recommended for use by drivers due to possible loss of control of weapon system and vehicle.

1. Upon making threat contact, the driver will activate the left turn signal and announce, "***Contact X o'clock.***"
2. The TC will place the driver's weapon into the crook of the driver's left arm by grasping the weapon by the pistol grip with the left hand and the hand-guard with the right. During placement of the weapon, the barrel should extend over the driver's left arm with the magazine located against the crook of the elbow. The TC will then announce, "***Secure Weapon.***"
3. The driver will grasp the pistol grip with his right hand and announce, "***Weapon Secure.***"
4. Hearing this, the TC will release the weapon and turn to scan his sector.
5. During the engagement, the driver will observe the threat area for two seconds, firing rapidly on semi-automatic. He should then direct attention back to the operation of the vehicle for two seconds. This should continue until there is no longer a threat.

6. In the event the driver runs out of ammo or experiences a weapon malfunction, the following actions will take place:
 - a. The driver will announce "***Out of ammo***" or "***Malfunction***" and place his weapon on safe.
 - b. The TC, ensuring his own weapon is on safe, will place his weapon between the driver's body and the driver's weapon using the same weapon handling procedures and announce, "***Weapon.***"
 - c. The TC will then grasp the butt stock of the driver's weapon with his right hand and announce, "***Secure Weapon.***"
 - d. The driver will then remove his hand from his weapon and grasp the pistol grip of the TC's weapon and announce, "***Weapon Secure.***"
 - e. The TC will then remove the driver's weapon, using two-hand control and return to his seat.
 - f. TC is responsible for clearing misfires/reloading the driver's weapon.
7. Following the reduction or elimination of the threat, the following actions will occur:
 - a. The driver will place his weapon on safe and announce "***Secure Weapon.***"
 - b. The TC will grasp the weapon with both hands and announce "***Weapon Secure.***"
 - c. The driver will then place his firing hand back onto the steering wheel, resume scanning, and turn off the turn signal.
8. Drivers should not fire when:
 - a. Vehicle is moving at speeds of 40 miles per hour (mph) or greater
 - b. During times of limited visibility (night, fog, heavy rain, dust storm)
 - c. During severe, hazardous, or limited road conditions (bridges, narrow paths, damaged roads, road construction)
 - d. In situations where there is a passenger who could cover his/her sector of fire (for example, in a four seat high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle [HMMWV])
 - e. In areas crowded with non-combatants

3-1-2. Truck Commander (TC) Contact Drill. The TC must continuously scan and remain alert for threats within his sector of scan (11 to 3 o'clock position).

Early identification will allow the TC to more quickly achieve proper body position and place effective suppressive fire on the threat within his/her sector of fire (1 to 3 o'clock position) using the following drill.

Drill 2:

Once a threat is identified, the TC will announce the threat to the driver (activate right turn signal) while attempting to engage the threat with suppressive fire within his sector of fire (1 to 3 o'clock position) using proper weapon engagement techniques.

a. Body positioning. TC should attempt to achieve a position that allows maximum stabilization inside the cab. Maximum stabilization depends on the type of vehicle and equipment in the area of the TC and must be practiced until the individual is comfortable.

- Firing shoulder should be the same side the individual normally uses.
- In order to achieve rapid effective aim, the weapon is brought up to the head (the head should not drop down).
- The shooter should ensure his elbow is down against his body in order to assist in locking the weapon into the crook of the shoulder.
- Individual shooters should use the back of the seat for support to maximize the individual's sector of fire and assist with stabilization.
- Firing to the rear (beyond 3 o'clock) should be limited, as it causes the individual to shift too far forward on the seat and prevents observation of his sector of scan.

b. Point of aim (POA). If the threat is stationary and the shooter is moving, POA will be to the right of the threat in order to allow the momentum of the shooter's rounds to drift left into the threat. A shooter's POA in reference to elevation will always be low (or short). First, this allows the shooter to see the impact of his rounds and quickly adjust his fire. Short rounds cause ricochets and flying debris that can force the threat to seek cover. Last, it provides an effective control measure to limit the risk of civilian casualties and/or property damage.

c. Rate of fire. All personnel other than drivers should engage threats with 3-round bursts. Bursts should be triggered rapidly because of dispersion caused by speed of vehicle and limited time to engage.

3-1-3: Exit/Enter a Vehicle Crew Drill: It is essential to establish and practice a drill to sustain suppressive fire and provide maximum protection for personnel from threat contact in halted vehicles. This drill is written for vehicles with two personnel. If there are other occupants, the drill should be modified as needed and rehearsed. The non-contact side occupant and contact side occupant could be personnel on either side of the vehicle.

Drill 3

1. Exit the vehicle. Once determined by the convoy leadership or the crew that it is now time to exit the vehicle, the following actions will occur:

- a. The occupant on the contact/threat side of the vehicle identifies the threat and establishes or maintains a base of fire using the burst method.
- b. The non-contact side occupant, ensuring his/her weapon is on safe, exits the vehicle first maintaining as low a profile as possible and moves to the portion of the vehicle that offers the best degree of protection and immediately returns fire. Engagements while dismounted should be on semi-automatic to conserve ammunition. At this time, this individual should announce “*In Position.*”
- c. At this time, the contact-side occupant ceases engaging and, ensuring his/her weapon is on safe, exits vehicle through the non-contact/threat side door. Once on the ground, this individual will then move to the portion of the vehicle that offers the best degree of protection and immediately return fire. At this time, this individual should announce “*In Position.*” He/she will now engage on semi-automatic.
- d. Both driver and TC will occasionally scan the area to their rear to ensure there is no threat from that direction.

2. Enter the vehicle. Once determined by the convoy leadership or the crew that it is now time to enter the vehicle, the following actions will occur:

- a. The non-contact/non-threat side occupant will continue to engage or observe the threat location.
- b. The contact-side occupant ensuring his weapon is on safe moves to the non-contact side door and while maintaining a low profile and enters the vehicle. Once positioned in the contact/threat side seat, this individual will then provide cover by fire; maintain observation of the possible threat; or, if he is the driver, prepare the vehicle for movement. The contact/threat side occupant will announce “*In Position.*”
- c. At this time, the non-contact/threat side occupant, ensuring his/her weapon is on safe, moves to the non-contact side door and maintaining a low profile enters the vehicle. Once positioned in the non contact/threat side seat, this individual will then provide cover by fire, maintain observation of the possible threat, or prepare the vehicle for movement.

Techniques and Procedures for Vehicle Drills:

- ✓ Consider the three-dimensional environment (width, depth, and elevation)
- ✓ Maintain a predatory presence, “Go ahead...make my day!” attitude

- ✓ Watch people, their behavior, and their hands
- ✓ Class V individual load should be 420 rounds per M16 or M4, 600 rounds per M249, and a full vest of 24 rounds per M203 on the individual with the same amount of rounds stored in the vehicle. One thousand rounds per M2 or M240B and 256 rounds per MK19 should also be carried per mission. All additional ammunition should be located within arm's reach while in vehicles.
- ✓ Magazine and ammunition maintenance should occur each time the weapon system is cleaned. Proper method to unload magazines is to push rounds from the magazine as the bolt would. Improper unloading spreads the lips of the magazine causing double feeds. Majority of all M16/M4 malfunctions are magazine faults.
- ✓ Uniform and equipment should be closely examined as unnecessary items will interfere with body positioning and weapon engagement procedures and possibly make it difficult for Soldiers to exit the vehicle. Minimum equipment should be body armor, Kevlar, first-aid pouch with two field dressings (entry and exit wounds), two ammo pouches, two canteens, and specialty-tasked equipment. Ammunition should be in ammunition pouches attached to the fragmentation vest. Ammunition stored any other place will disrupt a shooter's body position and view of sector when changing magazines. Magazine changes should be practiced until this task can be rapidly accomplished without looking.
- ✓ Driver's weapon must be stored in a location that ensures the TC can get to it with minimal effort.
- ✓ Equipment in the interior of the vehicle must be stored in a manner to leave a clear lane for all personnel to dismount to either side.
- ✓ Additional items that must be dismounted include combat lifesaver (CLS) bag, dismount radio systems, and additional ammunition, all of which should be located within arm's reach while in vehicles.
- ✓ Driver's awareness of the hazards with operating a vehicle and employing a weapon simultaneously should be discussed and practiced while moving in order to understand the hazards. This drill can be practiced without firing in stationary and mounted rehearsals.
- ✓ Driver's conducting engagements will have hot expended casings being thrown against the windshield and into the seat area. Sleeves should be down at all times.
- ✓ If threats appear on both sides, the TC will direct fires on both threats.
- ✓ Individuals should not use the door window frames for support, as this will transfer all road vibrations and affect aiming. Individuals should also not attempt to tie weapons to the top of door frames (door gunner), as this may prevent the weapon from being removed or adjusted.
- ✓ There should never be more than two personnel firing from the front or the rear of a vehicle at any one time (one in the prone position and one kneeling at his/her side)

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

- ✓ All occupants of a vehicle should be seat belted until contact occurs. The TC may have to release his seat belt to fire effectively or support the driver.
- ✓ Priority of effort should be given to suppressing the threat when casualties occur. Once halted, all efforts should be made by other occupants of the vehicle to extract casualties to the ground prior to the arrival of the aid and litter (A&L) team.
- ✓ When dismounted, shooters should assume a good supported firing position that provides maximum cover and engage on semi-automatic (slow aimed fire).
- ✓ Some permanently mounted equipment may prevent occupants from exiting the safe side of the vehicle. In this case, the occupants may exit on the threat side and quickly move around the front of the vehicle to the safe/non-contact side in a low ready position. Rehearsing this crew drill will make it easier to execute. Extreme care should be used while running around the vehicle to prevent fratricide.
- ✓ 360-degree security must be maintained at all times around halted vehicles. Restricting terrain or obstacles may dictate that some individuals or gun trucks are repositioned to cover any concealed avenue of approach.

3-1-4: Exit/Enter Cargo Area of a Vehicle Crew Drill: It is essential to establish and practice a drill to sustain suppressive fire and provide maximum protection for personnel in the cargo area of a halted vehicle. If there are other occupants, the drill should be modified as needed and rehearsed. The non-contact side occupant and contact side occupant could be personnel on either side of the vehicle.

Recommend Cargo Area Load Capacities:

Cargo high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)	4 personnel total	2 personnel per side firing.
2 1/2 or 5-ton	8 personnel total	4 personnel per side firing.
Light medium tactical vehicles (LMTVs)	8 personnel total	4 personnel per side firing.

Drill 4:

1. Hardened cargo area.

- a. If the vehicle has a hardened cargo area (provides protection up to a .50 cal), the personnel may remain mounted.
- b. The occupant(s) on the contact/threat side of the vehicle identifies the threat and establishes or maintains a base of fire, using the side of the cargo area for support and firing on semi-automatic.
- c. The non-contact side occupant(s) will continue to scan his/her sectors in order to provide 360-degree security.

2. Exit the cargo area (not hardened).
 - a. The occupant(s) on the contact/threat side of the vehicle identifies the threat and establishes or maintains a base of fire, using the side of the cargo area for support and firing on semi-automatic.
 - b. After the driver or TC has taken up a security position at the rear of the vehicle, the non-contact side occupant(s) ensures his/her weapon is on safe and notifies the firing person at the rear of his/her intention. The non contact side occupant(s) then (one at a time, if there are more than one) exits the cargo area of the vehicle, maintaining as low a profile as possible. He/she remains in a location that provides cover and by looking left, right, and rear allows for effective fire and/or situational awareness both up and down the convoy on the non-contact side. At this time, the last individual to exit should announce, "***In Position.***"
 - c. At this time, one at a time, the contact side occupant(s) ceases engaging and ensures his/her weapon is on safe and exits vehicle on the non-contact side. Once on the ground, the individual(s) will remain in a location that provides cover and allows effective fires and/or situational awareness to the non-contact side, both up and down the convoy.
 - d. Individuals may take up a firing position if there is only one person at the front or rear of the vehicle. There should never be more than two personnel firing from the front or the rear of a vehicle at any one time (one in the prone position and one kneeling at his/her side).
 - e. Once cargo area personnel are dismounted, they may replace TC or driver at firing positions, ensuring that the most lethal weapon system is placed on the ground to obtain fire superiority and maintain suppression.
3. Enter the vehicle. Once the convoy leadership or the crew determine that it is time to enter the vehicle, the following actions will occur:
 - a. The cargo area personnel will allow for the crew to remount first in order to prepare the vehicle for movement.
 - b. The non-contact/non-threat side occupant(s) will continue to engage or observe the threat location, while the contact side occupants remount one at a time, in reverse order of how they dismounted and will announce, "***In Position.***"
 - c. Once in position, the contact personnel will signal for the non-contact side personnel to remount.
 - d. The contact side occupant(s) will continue to engage or observe the threat location, while the non-contact side occupants remount one at a time, in reverse order of how they dismounted.

e. Based on unit SOP, the cargo area personnel signal the crew (for example: two slaps on the roof of the driver's compartment) when everyone has remounted and are ready to proceed.

Techniques and Procedures for Vehicle Drills

- ✓ Do not roll with tailgate open. To do so risks Soldiers, particularly those who may be wounded while moving or who may fall out of the open tailgate.
- ✓ If exiting the cargo area over the side of the vehicle, the first Soldier will hand his/her weapon to his battle buddy prior to exiting. Once on the ground, he will secure his/her weapon and that of the battle buddy allowing freedom to maintain a three point contact exit.
- ✓ If exiting from the tailgate, each Soldier may maintain his/her weapon and place it on the bed while exiting.
- ✓ Three possible positions for personnel from the cargo area are as follows:
 - 1) Positioned on the non-contact side of the vehicle between the two wheel firing positions where they can engage the enemy
 - 2) Positioned to cover a 360-degree threat
 - 3) Positioned to assist with providing command and control by using radios and/or hand and arm signals.

SECTION TWO: Convoy Battle Drills

3-2-1 React to Contact/Threat (Maintain Movement). This drill is designed to establish procedures for actions to be taken by a convoy when confronted with enemy contact. This threat can range from direct weapons fire, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and/or indirect fires. The intent is to maintain movement and increasing speed in order to reduce exposure and deny the threat the ability to effectively engage the convoy.




Figure 3-1

Drill 1

1. Continuously observe sectors of scan.
2. Place suppressive fire on the threat using individual weapon engagement techniques provided in "Vehicle Battle Drills." Proceed through the contact zone increasing speed and interval and do not bunch up.
3. Activate vehicle turn signal to indicate direction of contact or most dangerous contact when engaged from both sides.
4. Report contact on internal communication(s), identifying truck number, type of contact, and clock direction.
5. Gun trucks maintain front and rear security of the convoy as the convoy continues movement through the contact zone. Engagement of the threat should occur without affecting the momentum of the gun truck or the convoy. If gun truck(s) are required to reposition or stop in order to engage, they will assume their original position(s) when the convoy passes out of the contact area.
6. Convoy leadership submits size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report to higher.
7. Convoy will proceed to rally point "forward."
8. Any vehicle with a casualty will maintain momentum and activate four-way flashers. If possible, the uninjured occupant will notify convoy leadership using communication systems.

Techniques and Procedures:

- ✓ Drivers must remain focused on the vehicle to their front and rear as those vehicles may be unaware that contact has occurred. Maintain interval and be ready to execute sudden maneuvers if vehicles to the front are forced to stop.
- ✓ Activate turn signal only while the contact/threat is in each vehicle's sector; this action will assist personnel to quickly focus on the exact location.
- ✓ Reporting should be second in priority to engaging the threat. When reporting within a convoy, call signs should be designated vehicle position (first vehicle is Truck 1, second is Truck 2, etc.). This allows personnel to quickly identify the location of concern.
- ✓ Reports should be accurate and concise (who, what, where, and when).
- ✓ Convoy leadership should identify and direct target engagements of gun truck(s) (for example: Gun Truck 1 engage RPG team, 3 o'clock, 200 meters).
- ✓ Convoy commanders should submit a request for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) as soon as there is an indication of a serious casualty. Do not wait until you reach the rally point. A specific grid can be transmitted later.

3-2-2. React to Contact (Forced To Stop). This drill is designed to establish procedures for actions to be taken by a convoy when forced to stop because of severely damaged vehicles and/or serious injury to a driver. This contact/threat can range from threat direct weapons fire, RPG fire, IEDs, and/or indirect fires. The intent of the drill is to prevent further injuries/damage and allow the convoy to quickly exit the contact zone. While this drill identifies basic procedures, the location of the contact within the convoy, the specific threat, and friendly casualties will require convoy leaders to make timely decisions and issue rapid fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to adjust this drill.




Figure 3-2

Drill 2:

1. Personnel in vehicle(s) forced to stop will return fire and exit the vehicle.
2. All other vehicles in the convoy will stop and where possible return fire/exit the vehicle. Once dismounted, the convoy will rapidly gain fire superiority using well-aimed semi-automatic fire from both flanks of the threat.
3. Vehicle(s) not in direct contact will report on internal communication if possible, identifying truck number, type of contact, and clock direction.
4. Convoy leadership will reposition to better assess the situation and reposition gun truck(s), using available cover and concealment and standoff range to increase the volume of fire in the contact zone from multiple directions.




Figure 3-3

5. Once convoy leadership determines the convoy has either gained fire superiority or defeated the enemy threat, the senior convoy leader will decide to execute casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)/recovery. Pre-determined destruction criteria should be established during planning to expedite operations when recovery is not possible.

6. If the convoy leadership determines the convoy cannot gain fire superiority or eliminate the threat, the leadership will break contact from the kill zone.

Techniques and Procedures

- ✓ Leaders outside the contact zone must establish 360-degree security and be aware of a second potential threat from a different direction.
- ✓ Convoy leadership should identify and direct gun truck(s) target engagement (for example: "Gun Truck 1 engage RPG team, 3 o'clock, 200 meters").
- ✓ Conservation of ammunition is important. Once dismounted, all personnel should be engaging with weapons in the semi-automatic mode and engage only visible threat targets.
- ✓ Prior to breaking contact, an attempt should be made to recover all weapons and sensitive items from vehicles that are non-recoverable and/or being abandoned

3-2-3. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) and Recovery Drill: CASEVAC is defined as the removal of casualties from a high-risk situation or area. Personnel will not be able to provide immediate aid until fire superiority has been established. Once fire superiority is achieved, extraction and movement of casualties will often require field expedient procedures. Recovering vehicle(s) from the contact zone should be conducted with hasty recovery procedures.




Figure 3-4

Drill 3:

1. Once the convoy leadership determines that the area in the vicinity of the casualty(s) and/or disabled vehicle(s) is secure or the enemy is suppressed, CASEVAC and recovery operations may begin.

2. CASEVAC:

- a. The A&L team will move forward blowing their horn continuously to warn dismounts of the vehicle's approach and position their vehicle on the non-contact side of the vehicle with the casualty(s). The A&L team will then extract casualties and load them immediately into the aid and litter vehicle as safely and quickly as possible.
- b. Treatment of the casualty(s) will not occur inside the threat area except for emergency treatment to prevent loss of life and then only as the A&L vehicle is departing the area.
- c. The convoy commander must decide what other vehicles in the convoy will accompany the A&L vehicle (with casualties on board) to a floating rally point. As a minimum, there will be one additional vehicle to provide security, with a leader and Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) capability.

3. Vehicle recovery procedures:

- a. Recovery team will position on the safe side of the disabled vehicle in the same manner as the A&L team.
- b. TC will dismount and assess the disabled vehicle, looking for any safety reason why hasty recovery (chains, tow-straps, or cables, not tow bars) cannot be accomplished.
- c. If it is determined the vehicle can be safely recovered, TC will guide the recovery vehicle into a position that best allows a hasty hook-up. The driver of the disabled vehicle will then mount and

operate the disabled vehicle until free of the contact area. If the driver is a casualty, the TC of the recovery vehicle will operate the vehicle being towed.

d. Upon exiting the contact area or at the rally point, hook-up procedures will occur using a tow bar.

Techniques and Procedures:

- ✓ A CLS or medic should not be assigned to an A&L team unless the unit has sufficient CLSs to provide first line treatment at the rally point. Personnel assigned this task should have basic CLS knowledge/training in order to provide basic treatment at the casualty collection point (CCP).
- ✓ Personnel dismounted inside the contact zone will initially engage the enemy threat. Due to the risk of more casualties, treatment or CASEVAC is second in priority
- ✓ To permit rapid pick-up and safe transportation of casualties, A&L team vehicles should be free of extraneous equipment
- ✓ To ensure a quick exit from the contact area, A&L and recovery vehicle drivers will not exit their vehicles in the contact zone
- ✓ Hasty hook-up procedures should be established by unit leaders. Hasty recovery devices can be chains or cables already rigged on the recovery vehicle. All other vehicles must have a capability to quickly hook-up this chain or cable.
- ✓ A&L and recovery personnel will not separate themselves from their weapons during CASEVAC or recovery operations.
- ✓ Once the casualties are loaded or the vehicle recovered, A&L and recovery teams should contact convoy leadership when ready to move.

3-2-4. Break Contact. The Break Contact Drill is designed to establish basic procedures for withdrawing personnel and equipment from a situation where the convoy is either unable to gain fire superiority or the mission dictates immediate withdrawal. Leaders must adapt to the situation, as different actions may be required based on disposition of convoy assets on either side of the contact zone. This drill begins with the decision to withdraw.

Drill 4:

1. Convoy leadership will identify either rally point “rear” or “forward” or, if necessary, both rally points. Communication systems and/or appropriate pyrotechnic signals will be used to communicate/signal the decision to break contact and the designated rally point(s).
2. Personnel on vehicles to be abandoned will remove weapons and other sensitive items and initiate destruction based on guidance established in the convoy brief.
3. Personnel in the contact zone will assist with evacuation of all casualties

as required. Personnel not required will continue to engage the threat location in order to provide fire support for the convoy's withdrawal. Once dismounted individuals have bounded back to safe locations, leaders must ensure that all personnel are accounted for.

4. Leaders within the contact zone will direct personnel remaining to bound individually in the direction of egress, maintaining covering fire to the extent possible.




Figure 3-5

5. Vehicles that are functional can displace either backwards or forwards. Vehicles closest to the threat move first as demonstrated in Figures 3-5 or 3-6. Vehicles will continue to displace in this fashion until all personnel and vehicles have cleared the contact zone. As personnel and vehicles displace, it is important to reposition leaders and gun truck(s) as necessary to maintain command and control and suppressive fires in support of the breakout.




Figure 3-6

6. Upon exiting the threat/contact zone, personnel and/or vehicles will move to and occupy the designated rally point(s) and begin consolidation and reorganization.

Techniques and Procedures

- ✓ Conservation of ammunition is important. All personnel once dismounted should be engaging with weapons in the semi-automatic mode.
- ✓ When executing casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), it may be necessary to maneuver additional personnel from A&L teams into the contact area to assist.
- ✓ Personnel in the contact zone are best positioned to determine the direction they break contact.
- ✓ Movement from the contact zone in vehicle(s) may not be possible if it requires turning the vehicle around while in contact. Personnel in these situations may be required to abandon their vehicle. It is essential for dismounted individuals breaking contact to move in the shortest direction to achieve a safe covered position. This may cause a round about route back to the remainder of the convoy.
- ✓ When moving in or from the contract zone, it is important to use all available cover and concealment.
- ✓ Pre-determined destruction criteria and procedures should be established and provided if the vehicle/cargo is sensitive.

3-2-5: Occupy a Floating Rally Point(s): Floating rally points are established using a determined distance either forward or rear of a contact depending on the nature of the contact and disposition of vehicles. A floating rally point rather than fixed or predetermined rally points is used because contact locations are unpredictable. Once at a floating rally point, a unit will need to establish a formation that facilitates security, command and control, consolidation, and reorganization activities.




Figure 3-7

Drill 5:

1. Unless otherwise directed, floating rally point “forward” will be located approximately two to six miles in the direction of movement and/or outside the range of enemy weapon systems being employed against you. The floating rally point “rear” will be located approximately two to six miles and/or outside the range of enemy weapon systems being employed against you. Whenever possible, the actual rally point site selected should be in an open area with maximum observation in all directions and should not be located near built up areas.

2. Occupation of the rally point will occur using the “box formation.” If possible, the shoulder of the road will be used if conditions are appropriate and safe for all vehicles. If unable to pull off the roadway, vehicles will establish the formation to the right side of the roadway to allow civilian vehicles to move around the convoy’s left side. Occupation will begin with the first vehicle positioning his/her vehicle in a manner that blocks direct entry into the front center of the formation. All additional vehicles will alternate right and left in order to establish the rest of the box as pictured in Figure 3-7. The convoy commander and/or command and control vehicle(s) will be positioned inside the center/safe area. The rear of the box will be blocked in the same manner as the front.

3. Gun truck(s), while primarily responsible for maintaining support by fire positions, are also part of the consolidation and reorganization. Gun truck(s) will normally occupy the 12 and 6 o’clock position in the convoy box formation. If the rally point is in restricted terrain, gun trucks may be positioned to cover dead space or even patrol around the convoy box.

4. Drivers and passengers dismount towards the inside of the box and establish perimeter security. Leaders must ensure that 360-degree security is established and maintained.

5. Casualty treatment/evacuation:

a. Casualty treatment will begin upon occupying the rally point. Vehicles with casualties on board will have four-way flashers turned on. The A&L team will remove the casualty from the vehicle and immediately begin buddy-aid until relieved by a CLS.

b. CLSs will scan vehicles in search of casualties (four-way flashers). Upon encountering a casualty, the CLS will evaluate buddy-aid and, if adequate, continue his search.

c. A&L teams secure and transport casualties to the CCP designated by convoy leadership using litters, fully assembled cots, body bags, or other improvised conveyance. The CCP is typically located in the center of the formation behind the convoy commander’s vehicle. After movement of casualties, A&L teams will assist the CLS with treatment and preparation for movement/evacuation. A&L teams are also responsible for securing weapons and other sensitive items belonging to seriously wounded casualties.

d. Convoy commander will direct initiation of the MEDEVAC request based on situation and casualty status. The convoy commander's driver will submit the actual MEDEVAC request using the approved 9-line report (see example in Section Four: Reports and Signaling).

6. Landing zone (LZ) procedures:

a. The LZ should be at least 75 to 100 meters downwind from the rally point. It can be marked with VS-17 panel, smoke, reflective hazard triangles, chem lites, or vehicle lights.

b. Helicopters land and take off into the wind. The LZ selected should not require the helicopter to land or take off over the convoy.

c. The LZ is secured with a gun truck or similar vehicle equipped with an automatic weapon. The gun truck moves to a location away from the flight path of the landing helicopter, but in a good fire support position to provide early warning of approaching enemy elements. The LZ area is cleared of anything that may be sucked into the aircraft engine or is hazardous in any way.

d. When the aircraft notifies the convoy that it is in-bound, a member of the LZ team deploys a smoke grenade (if available) to indicate wind direction. The grenade should be dropped on the down-wind side of the LZ so as not to obscure it.

e. The casualty is positioned within the box formation, at a point which allows rapid movement to the LZ and is sheltered from the rotor wash. Once the aircraft has set-down, the helicopter crew chief will signal the A&L team when to approach the aircraft. The A&L team approaches the aircraft from the flank, staying well clear of the tail rotor. Once loaded, the A&L team should retrace their steps away from the aircraft and return to their normal duties.

7. Consolidation and reorganization begin when the rally point/location has been secured. These procedures can be accomplished concurrently with treating and evacuating casualties.

8. Personnel will report their ammunition status to first line leaders. Ammunition report will be based on how many full magazines are available. Subordinate leaders will immediately redistribute ammunition at their level and report to the next leader.

9. Drivers will inspect vehicles and cargo for damage. Concurrently, recovery teams will conduct proper hook-up procedures and prepare damaged vehicles for safe operation. Subordinate leaders will conduct weapon, communication, and sensitive item inspections and ready personnel for onward movement.

10. Any personnel from the cargo areas of large vehicles may be used to fill in on perimeter security or special tasks (for example: LZ set-up/security, A&L support). No more than two personnel should occupy any firing position.

11. Convoy commander will submit a SALUTE and ammunition, casualty, and equipment (ACE) report to higher headquarters.

Techniques and Procedures:

- ✓ To protect yourself from VBIEDs, it is recommended that you pull off the road at least 100 m to create stand-off from other vehicles.
- ✓ Distance to floating rally points should be varied constantly to prevent setting a pattern that can be exploited by the enemy.
- ✓ Gun truck crews will not dismount at a rally point unless required for casualties. These vehicles must be manned and ready to reposition at all times.
- ✓ In high VBIED threat areas, gun trucks may need to be positioned away from the box along both directions of travel. If either the lead or trail gun truck repositions, other vehicles must move to close the end of the box.
- ✓ Interval between vehicles should be enough that vehicle(s) can pull out of the formation; however, the interval should be tight enough to prevent threat vehicles from having a high-speed avenue into the safe area.
- ✓ The box formation allows leadership and individuals to speed consolidation and reorganization activities, as well as provide a safe and secure area. Herringbone and column formations fail to provide these basic requirements.
- ✓ Dismounted personnel positioning should be inside the safe area using vehicle(s) as cover. Locations between the rear and front of vehicles provide no protection/cover and are also considered an unsafe area if vehicle(s) are still in gear or should happen to roll forward.
- ✓ Personnel providing security will normally be positioned inside the box. Personnel should stay inside the box unless directed otherwise and must take care to avoid being run over by other vehicles entering the box. All security personnel will exit the box only if required by special tasks (for example: cover restricted terrain or set up an LZ).
- ✓ All measures should be taken to prevent civilian vehicles from becoming blocked by a convoy's rally point formation, as this will cause additional problems with crowd control issues. Personnel in the rear of the box should be prepared to direct people around the convoy.
- ✓ Drivers of command and control vehicles should remain mounted to monitor the radios.
- ✓ It is possible that the initial vehicles entry into the floating rally point will be a leader vehicle accompanied by the A&L vehicle. As the remainder of the convoy approaches, they will establish the box around these vehicles.
- ✓ Rally point procedures should be completed as rapidly as possible because of the proximity of the enemy threat.

3-2-6. Vehicle borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)/Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): VBIEDs and IEDs are currently the greatest threats to coalition forces in theater. Threat forces have turned to the employment of IEDs as the preferred method of attack, as this provides the threat a standoff capability to initiate an attack and then quickly escape the area. Some of these attacks include the use of direct fire weapons immediately following or prior to the detonation of an IED. Training should be scheduled frequently to update all personnel on the current IED threat. The intent of this drill is to safeguard the unit or element while securing the IED site. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) should be treated in the same manner as an IED. All personnel in a convoy must be alert for camouflaged IEDs in their sector of scan.

VBIED Trends: VBIEDs with suicide drivers are targeting coalition convoys. Initially these vehicles attempted to enter convoy formations on the move. This proved ineffective due to convoy speed and intervals. The emerging technique is to target stationary convoys or groups of Soldiers. TTP to mitigate the threat include the following:

- Hang signs in Arabic “Remain 100 meters from vehicle – Do Not Pass” visible at 50 meters
- Use flash/bang grenades (non-lethal) as a warning devices for vehicles getting too close
- Employ any electronic countermeasures available
- Use cones and/or barriers with signs to keep vehicles 100 m away while halted
- If suspicious vehicles ignore these warnings and close within 50 m , you may shoot to kill the driver.

What VBIEDs look like:

- Mostly cars, some light trucks
- Vehicle appears heavy laden (rear axle weighted down)
- Single male drivers (normally in their mid-20s, but this is not always the case) dressed in normal Iraqi attire or dressed inappropriately for vehicle type. May be clean shaven with short haircut as this is part of the purifying ritual that many follow prior to an attack.
- Aggressive or erratic driving (this factor alone is insufficient to engage)
- Some vehicles are stationary on the side of the road and are detonated from a stand-off position

What VBIEDs do not look like:

- Large trucks and buses
- Vehicles carrying multiple people, family or children in vehicle
- Aggressive or erratic driving (this is also common driving behavior here)

- Vehicle stationary on the side of the road with people around it or working on it

Reaction to VBIEDs: Vehicles rapidly approaching convoys who have the characteristics of VBIEDs and fail to slow down or maintain a safe distance represent a credible hostile intent. There is a designated 100 m exclusion zone and suspicious vehicles may be engaged within the 50 m. The point of aim should be the driver. The engagement should be short bursts into the drivers side of the windshield. Hitting the vehicles tires or engine may slow it down, but is not likely to stop it completely. Stationary vehicles along the road identified as a potential VBIED should be handled in accordance with (IAW) procedures described below for IEDs/UXOs.

Recent Vignette: On a recent convoy a noncommissioned officer (NCO) saw this abandoned vehicle sitting in the roadway (see Figure 3-8 below).

1. Notice how far out it is sitting from the edge of the road. Normally, broken vehicles are a common sight in Iraq, but they are usually more off the shoulder.
2. There are no people around.
3. The jugs/containers are also a common sight in Iraq. A lot of fuel is sold on the roadside in this fashion, containers sitting on the side of the road (again not this far out).



Figure 3-8

The convoy immediately stopped and backed off, blocked the road, and called in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

Another unit had a patrol of three HMMWVs roll up. They were advised of the situation and told to find an alternate route or drive past by crossing over the median (6 lane highway) and driving past the suspicious vehicle. Instead of driving in the opposing lanes they elected not to cross the median and just drive on the far side of their current lane. As the patrol rolled by the VBIED detonated, obviously under observation for command detonation. See Figure 3-9 below.



Figure 3-9: VBIED detonation

No one was seriously injured, one high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) was damaged (up-armored with window closed and gunner inside as they passed). These potential casualties and damage would not have occurred if the second convoy had adhered to the 300 m minimum safe distance established in Multi-National Coalition-Iraq (MNC-I) directives.



Figure 3-10: VBIED remains



Figure 3-11: VBIED remains

IED Trends:

- IEDs are most often designed to be command detonated by either a hardwired system (speaker wire, red detonation cord, yellow wire with blasting caps) or a remote controlled system (car alarms, cell phone, garage door opener, cordless phones, Motorola radios.)
- IEDs are normally designed using mortar rounds, artillery projectiles, plastics, TNT, and other explosive-filled ordnance. These typically already have a method to produce fragmentation.
- Locations for the enemy to command detonate are often within line of sight (usually 150 to 200 m away.)
- IED camouflaging typically has been with items that resemble the garbage along roadways, broken down vehicles (VBIED), roadside containers, dirt mounds, and tires. IEDs are elevated behind road signs and hidden in trees or other items that appear to be normal.
- IED emplacement has been located under the paving stones either on walkways or road systems. These devices can also be buried in potholes or in the unimproved road surfaces.
- The enemy has been known to use obvious decoy devices (bait device) out in the open to slow or stop convoys in the targeted zone where the actual device is hidden or ambush is planned. Often, multiple IEDs are emplaced in one general location.
- IEDs and other devices have been deployed from overpasses. Typically these devices are either thrown by personnel or swung down or hung from measured ropes to ensure target strike is at windshield/operator level. Trip wires has also been used and piano wire has been used to decapitate gunners.
- Individuals of all ages, both male and female have employed IEDs.
- The majority of IEDs are placed during darkness to limit the chance of the individual being seen or confronted while emplacing the device.
- IEDs are often employed during early morning hours against the first convoy passing by.
- Maintain a standoff distance of at least 300 meters from suspected IEDs/UXO as communication devices may cause detonation or enemy personnel may have the ability to remotely command detonate.
- The enemy has begun to burn vehicle tires on asphalt roads, this is to loosen the asphalt for emplacement of IEDs underneath the road surface. The IED then looks like a patch in the road.
- IEDs are now being executed followed by small arms ambush or RPG attack; this is a complex ambush and may come from both sides of the convoy

- The enemy have begun to put ball bearings into IEDs to achieve more fragmentation. They are also putting soap chips in IEDs with fuel so when it explodes it sticks and burns the skin.

Reaction to IEDs/UXO

The following steps “The five Cs” describe the MNC-I standard for reacting to an IED/UXO that is discovered prior to detonation. The intent of this drill is to safeguard the unit or element while securing the IED site. UXO should be treated the same as an IED. All personnel in a convoy must be alert for camouflaged IEDs in their sector of scan.

Drill 6:

1. Confirm and report:

- a. The first vehicle to identify an IED should turn on the appropriate turn signal indicating contact and use a unit designated IED marking system.
- b. The nearest vehicle (outside of 100 m from the IED) with a radio must transmit the location of the IED using vehicle interval call sign and distance/direction of the threat (for example: "This is vehicle #4, possible IED, 3 o'clock, 50 meters").
- c. Convoy leadership confirms the presence of a possible IED and immediately contacts their higher command and supporting EOD unit to respond using the IED/UXO report. Leadership should also take all necessary actions to report on the sheriff/military police (MP) frequency in order to provide other convoys in the area with the information.

2. Clear:

- a. All leaders must take immediate action to halt or reposition vehicles a minimum of 300 m away from the IED site. Detonation may be imminent if located prior to being activated. Be alert for the possibility that all IEDs have not been located.
- b. Once the convoy clears the minimum 300 m safe distance from the suspected IED, either the lead or trail gun truck will conduct a 25 to 50 m sweep on each side of the road to locate IED materials/equipment (detonation cord, receivers, or transmitters) that may lead to other IEDs flanking the convoy. The driver and TC of the sweep gun truck will be responsible for conducting the scan of the area for IED material.
- c. The gunner of the sweep gun truck will be responsible for scanning the area for personnel detonating the IED.
- d. The second gun truck will provide overwatch of the convoy, as well as overwatch for the first gun truck conducting the IED sweep.

If subsequent IEDs are located, units will execute the procedures for clearing the area as listed above.

e. If terrain or obstacles prevent the gun trucks from making the area sweep, selected personnel from within the convoy will make a dismounted sweep 25 to 50 m out to locate any IED materials. The dismounted sweep is to be covered/overwatched by stationary direct fire shooters.

3. Cordon: Secure the area to prevent unauthorized personnel entrance (300 m from a small device/1000 m for a van-size device/2000 m for a truck-size device).

4. Control: Maintain visual (binoculars/scopes) observation on the IED to ensure no tampering occurs. Immediately report any people observed approaching the IED to your chain of command.

5. Check: Check for secondary devices that may be around any area where you would set up a perimeter.

Techniques and Procedures

- ✓ Recommend the use of a water bottle, partially filled with colored water, with a streamer attached as an IED marking system. These materials are readily available and would allow for each vehicle to carry a minimum of two markers.
- ✓ While approaching and moving through an overpass, the gun trucks may shift lanes and should orientate their weapon systems toward the overpass, scanning for signs of insurgents and IEDs.
- ✓ Do not use road shoulders or cut corners when making turns, IEDs are often placed at intersections where large vehicles will run off the road to easily make a turn.
- ✓ Gunners should stay in vehicles unexposed until contact is initiated, either by small arms contact or IED. Seventy-five percent of all IED casualties come from gunners exposing themselves. Once contact is initiated gunners should move up and begin to return fire.
- ✓ Vehicles should travel in the middle of the lane as much as possible in order to minimize the effects of an IED blast.
- ✓ Most convoys are traveling at a convoy interval of 75 to 100 m, this makes the ability of the enemy to attack more than one vehicle impossible with a single IED.




Figure 3-12




Figure 3-13




Figure 3-14




Figure 3-15



Figure 3-16




Figure 3-17




Figure 3-18




Figure 3-19

SECTION THREE: Gun Truck Drills and Formations for High Threat Areas

3-3-1. Gun Trucks. Gun trucks are essential direct fire support vehicles for convoys in a combat zone. These gun trucks may be internal to the convoy unit or part of an external convoy escort element assigned to protect the convoy. For the purpose of this handbook, a gun truck is considered to be, as a minimum, a vehicle with a top mounted automatic weapon capable of 360-degree observation and fields of fire.

Gun trucks may be used in a variety of ways. They can provide route security in designated areas and/or patrol assigned sectors to attack identified enemy elements in advance of a convoy. Gun trucks can provide stationary security at known danger areas or traffic control points (TCPs). When assigned to accompany a convoy, gun trucks may be used as a ground security element traveling in front of the convoy to clear danger areas such as overpasses and restricted terrain. Within the convoy, they can provide lead/rear security or for large serials, be dispersed throughout the order of march.

The convoy escort commander controls gun trucks in coordination with and under direction of the convoy commander. If at all possible, gun trucks supporting a convoy should be present for the convoy brief and final rehearsals to ensure complete synchronization of effort. While gun truck SOPs may be used to react quickly to various types of enemy contact, their movement, maneuver, and engagements must be coordinated with the convoy commander or other designated subordinate convoy leaders.

In the event of significant enemy contact against a convoy, gun trucks attempt to maneuver to the flanks of the threat; position themselves behind cover; and, from a stand-off distance, deliver accurate, sustained fires. This tactic requires constant coordination with the convoy leader closest to the threat to identify precise enemy and friendly locations. As in any close encounter with the enemy, success is measured by the ability to rapidly mass fires against the threat and concurrently avoid the risk of fratricide.

3-3-2. Gun Truck Maneuver Against a Stationary Threat: This drill establishes procedures and actions to be taken by convoy escort elements against significant enemy threats. Convoy escort elements will support convoys by providing overwatch security; clearing danger areas (overpasses, restricted terrain, and ambush sites); and immediately reacting, by fire and maneuver, to suppress or destroy enemy threats. The convoy escort commander will be the convoy commander for civilian convoys.

Drill 1:

1. Once a security element anywhere within the convoy makes contact, they will immediately shift to the contact side of the convoy, halt and return fire (**fix the enemy**). They will then activate the proper turn signal to indicate contact direction, send contact report to the convoy commander, and begin developing the situation.
2. The convoy escort commander will assess the situation and should maneuver a second escort element into a support by fire position (**flank the enemy**). The escort element in contact should describe the target location

and mark it, if possible, as the maneuvering element may be out of visual range initially.

3. This second security element moves rapidly into position, while the first covers their movement. This element should make use of all available cover and concealment in order to achieve a position that allows suppression of the enemy, while affording maximum standoff distance. This tactic reduces the effectiveness of the enemy's weapons while maximizing friendly weapon capabilities. Both escort elements should communicate to coordinate/deconflict their fires in the target area.




Figure 3-20

4. The next available escort element will simultaneously bound to the front of the convoy and continue to lead the convoy out of the kill zone (**move the convoy forward**). The convoy escort commander must alert the convoy commander that gun trucks are maneuvering on the contact side to prevent possible fratricide. The convoy must maintain momentum and positive control while moving through the contact area. If necessary, this escort element can split up so that one vehicle can move to the front of the convoy, while another picks up security.




Figure 3-21

5. When the convoy has cleared the contact area, escort elements providing fire support left in place will break contact by using the bounding overwatch technique until all elements are out of the engagement area and can move rapidly to the convoy rally point.

6. Report the contact to higher using the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) format or as directed by unit SOP.




Figure 3-22

Techniques and procedures:

- ✓ Situational awareness must be maintained by shooters within the convoy to avoid firing in the vicinity of any convoy escort elements which may be halted.
- ✓ The convoy commander should position himself in a position to best observe maneuvering security elements and control his convoy.

- ✓ Once contact occurs all convoy and security elements must continue to observe 360 degrees to detect any threat from a different direction.
- ✓ If at all possible, the convoy security element should have a separate radio frequency to avoid unnecessary radio traffic during engagements, with the convoy escort commander having two-net capability allowing him to communicate with the convoy commander.
- ✓ If four or more gun trucks are available, they can be organized to work in teams, as shown in the following diagram.




Figure 3-23

3-3-3. Gun Truck Drills and Formations for High Threat Areas. Hostile forces in Iraq have observed U.S. Army TTP and developed their own countermeasures. A current enemy tactic is to pull alongside or enter a convoy formation with the intent of splitting vehicles away or engage them with RPGs. Most recently insurgents are using VBIEDs in this role to inflict maximum casualties and damage.

Drill 2:

1. The most effective technique for clearing civilian traffic from within convoy formations is to have gun trucks running up and down each flank of the convoy. However, caution must be used because many Iraqi civilian drivers are not hostile, but drive aggressively. For this reason, gun trucks should flash their lights and sound their horn to get the driver's attention before moving alongside the vehicle to force him out of the formation or when approaching the rear of a civilian vehicle within the convoy. The degree of force that can be employed to eject civilian vehicles from the formation is determined by a unit's chain of command. Closing up the convoy formation is a second technique to prevent civilian infiltration. Note that these drills will not be possible with troop contributing nation (TCN) (white) convoys.

2. There are a variety of formations in use depending upon the threat situation and the type of road.

a. Column formation is a column of trucks with intervals as close as possible. Float gun trucks move up and down the flanks of the formation. This formation must be used with care on two lane roads with approaching traffic as indicated in Figure 3-24.




Figure 3-24

b. Inverted T formation is used on three lane roads. The primary purpose is to prevent civilian traffic from coming up from behind the convoy and getting intermingled with the convoy. The convoy itself runs the centerline of their two lanes. Gun trucks are in the front and rear, as well as running up and down both flanks of the formation, with two military trucks flanking the rear gun truck. Normal convoy speeds can be maintained when traffic permits. Intervals should be closed as much as possible based on speed of travel as indicated in Figure 3-25.




Figure 3-25

c. Diamond formation is used on three lane or larger roads. Again the intent is to control their section of the road and prevent civilian traffic from intermingling with the convoy. Due to the complexity of maintaining this formation, intervals and convoy speed may need to be decreased. See Figure 3-26.




Figure 3-26

3-3-4 Traffic Control Points (TCPs): The intent for convoys in built up areas, where choke points, direction changes, and negotiation of two-way traffic areas are required, is to maintain movement. Often this will necessitate slowing down, but every effort should be made to keep from halting the convoy. Gun trucks maneuvering forward to establish TCPs is a preferred method of achieving this intent. Convoy commanders should attempt to maintain gun trucks at the front and rear of the convoy while establishing these TCPs. Note that these techniques can be employed with both green and white convoys.

Drill 3

1. Choke points

- a. At locations where traffic is backed up so that the convoy is going to be slowed or stopped due to terrain or obstacles, it is necessary to block civilian traffic near the choke point to permit uninterrupted passage of the convoy.
- b. The designated gun trucks move forward rapidly and establish TCPs on the near and far side of the choke point. These TCPs stop traffic to allow the convoy to flow through the choke point as indicated in Figure 3-27.




Figure 3-27

2. Road intersection

- a. As the convoy approaches an intersection it reduces speed and closes intervals so that it is not possible for civilian vehicles to enter the formation.
- b. The designated gun trucks move forward rapidly and establish TCPs to block all civilian traffic indicated in Figure 3-28.




Figure 3-28

3. Multiple intersections: The same drill can be performed while passing through multiple intersections. Each additional intersection is handled by another TCP vehicle within the order of march as indicated in Figure 3-29.




Figure 3-29

4. Traffic circles: The following drill can be performed while passing through a traffic circle as indicated in Figure 3-30.




Figure 3-30

5. Exiting/Entering a multi-lane highway: Gun trucks must move ahead of the convoy to block and open a lane of traffic on the highway that the convoy is transitioning to as indicated in Figures 3-31 and 3-32.




Figure 3-31




Figure 3-32

SECTION FOUR: Reports and Signaling

3-4-1. Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Request. (Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF-7) Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Smart Card, 22 Nov 03)

Line 1: 6-digit universal transverse mercator (UTM) grid location of pick-up site.

Line 2: Radio frequency, call sign, and suffix of requesting personnel.

Line 3: Number of patients by precedence: Urgent, priority, and routine:

- Urgent: loss of life or limb within 2 hours.
- Priority: loss of life or limb with 4 hours.
- Routine: evacuation within 24 hours.

Line 4 : Special equipment required. As applicable, express either none, hoist, or stokes litter (basket).

Line 5: Number of patients by type (litter/ambulatory).

Line 6: Security of pick-up site. (What possible/known threat is in the area?)

Line 7: Method of marking pick-up site (near/far recognition devices).

Line 8: Patient nationality and status (coalition military, U.S. contractor, non-U.S. contractor, enemy prisoner of war [EPW])

Line 9: Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) contamination.

3-4-2. IED/UXO Report (CJTF-7 OIF Smart Card, 22 Nov 03)

Line 1: Date-time group (DTG). DTG device/item was discovered.

Line 2: Reporting activity. Unit and location (grid of device/item).

Line 3: Contact method. Radio frequency, call sign, point of contact (POC), and telephone number.

Line 4: Type of ordnance dropped, projected, placed, or thrown. If known, give the size of the hazard area and number of devices/items located. Without touching, disturbing, or approaching (trip wire/command detonated) the item, include details about size, shape, color, and condition (intact or leaking).

Line 5: NBC contamination. If present, be as specific as possible.

Line 6: Resources threatened. Report threatened personnel, equipment, facilities, or assets.

Line 7: Impact on mission. Provide short description of your tactical situation and how the presence of the device/item affects your status.

Line 8: Protective measures. Describe any measures taken to protect personnel and equipment

Line 9: Recommended priority. Recommend a priority for EOD response.

3-4-3. Spot/SALUTE Report (CJTF-7 OIF Smart Card, 22 Nov 03)

Size	What is the size of the element?
Activity	What are they doing?
Location	Grid coordinates of element.
Unit/Uniform	What unit/element is it? Or describe the element involved.
Time	DTG of observation.
Equipment	What equipment do they possess?
Friendly Status	Casualties; major damage, stationary or moving; location (negative report required)

Internal reporting is also critical, but needs to be brief: "Convoy commander this is Truck 6, 3 o'clock at 300 meters, RPG team over."

* Ensure you inform your higher headquarters the status of personnel and equipment as soon as possible (ASAP). Provide any other information that may be beneficial for the development of the situation.

3-4-4. Contact Report (Internal to the Convoy)

- **Call sign:** Convoy commander this is Truck 6, CONTACT!
- **Direction:** 3 o'clock
- **Distance:** 200 meters
- **Type of threat:** RPG and small arms

3-4-5. Close Air Support (CAS)/Handcuff Call (CAS/911, Frequency XXXX).

"Handcuff" is an airborne communications platform that can assist from Scania north to Turkey, east to Iran, and west to Syria. "Handcuff" can tag and track your convoy, relay messages and emergency requests to the nearest sheriff unit, coordinate quick reaction force (QRF) and MEDEVAC, coordinate CAS, and provide real time intelligence (intel) updates.

This is an emergency and intel channel only; any other traffic must remain off this frequency.

1. All convoys should call "Handcuff" as you SP at any point north of Scania.
- Give your position, destination, and number of vehicles. (This will allow "Handcuff" to track your convoy and report potential route hazards).

- Then call "Handcuff" while in route only if you:
 - Require assistance
 - Spot hazards which should be relayed to other convoys
 - Encounter delays
 - Need QRF, CAS, indirect fires, or MEDEVAC
- 2. You should also call "Handcuff" as you reach your destination.

CAS Request Format.

Line 1. Unit identification (ID) and frequency

Line 2. Target description

Line 3. Target location

Line 4. Type marking (how you will mark the target)

Line 5. Location of all friendly elements

Line 6. Proposed assault by fire (ABF) or battle position (BP) (for preplanned CAS)

Line 7. Fire support assets (if being used)

Line 8. Threat situation report (SITREP) (air defense artillery [ADA] capabilities)

Line 9. Fratricide control measures

EXAMPLE:

"Handcuff this is Convoy # 57654, request CAS over"

Line 1. HHC 325 Truck Company, 35.055

Line 2. 10 entrenched dismounts

Line 3. QP 980679

Line 4. Will mark left, right, and center with 40-mm high explosive (HE)

Line 5.

Line 6. None

Line 7. None

Line 8. Possible RPG threat to helos

Line 9. "Make fly over south to north along MSR Tiger, convoy on road marked with VS-17 panels; enemy to west of Tiger, over."

Note: "Handcuff "is only on station from 0900 to 1800 daily.

3-4-6: Visual (Hand and Arm) Signals: Effective convoy operations depend on clear and rapid communication between all elements. When frequency modulation (FM) communications are not available or vocal commands are ineffective due to excessive noise, a system of visual communication is an alternate means for transmitting orders and directives. The purpose of this paragraph is to standardize the use of visual signals during the conduct of convoy operations. Visual signals are any means of communication that require line of sight and can be used to transmit prearranged messages over short distances. However, visual signals do have certain limitations. They may not be effective in periods of limited visibility unless chem lights or flashlights are used. Additionally, they may be misunderstood if not executed properly and rehearsed with everyone in the convoy. There are six basic hand and arm signals that can be used as a primary or alternate means of communication during convoy operations. The effectiveness of hand and arm signals will increase by combining voice commands with visual signals.

- **Mount.** Extend one arm up and to the side. Make two or three arm movements up and down with palm facing upward.



Figure 3-34

- **Dismount.** Extend the arms. Make two or three movements up and down with hands open towards the ground.



Figure 3-35

- **Join Me, Follow Me, Or Come Forward.** Point toward person(s) or units(s). Beckon by holding the arm horizontally to the front, palm up, and motioning toward your body.




Figure 3-36

- **Assemble Or Rally.** Raise the arm vertically overhead, palm to the front, and wave in large, horizontal circles. This signal is normally followed by the signaler pointing to the assembly or rally site.



Figure 3-37

- **Move Forward (casualty evacuation [CASEVAC]).** This is a two-part signal. First, raise both arms and cross wrists above the head, palms to the front. Second, move the hands and forearms backward and forward, palms toward the chest.



Figure 3-38

- **Move Forward (recovery).** This is a two-part signal. First, extend the arm and fist toward the operator, thumb pointing up. Second, move the hands and forearms backward and forward, palms toward the chest.



Figure 3-39

- **I Am Ready, Ready To Move, or Are You Ready?** Extend the arm toward the person being signaled, then raise the arm slightly above horizontal, palm outward.



Figure 3-40

Appendix A

Convoy Warning Order Format

1. Situation: *General overview of enemy and friendly situation in the area of operation (AO). Friendly units are those that might provide direct support to the convoy along its route.*

2. Mission: *The mission statement is a clear, concise statement of the mission to be achieved. The mission statement will state WHO, WHAT (the task), WHEN (start point [SP] time), WHERE (usually a designation with a route[s]), and WHY (the purpose). An example of a restated mission statement is "1st Platoon moves Class III and V, 210800C, Dec 03, from Navistar to Scania on MSR Tampa in order to resupply 3BCT, 1st Armored Division."*

3. Task Organization: *This is a critical component of a good warning order (WARNO). It is the initial convoy manifest. (See Appendix B for considerations for convoy organization and order of movement and manifest format).*

4. Initial Time Schedule: *Explanation and format following the convoy WARNO format.*

5. Special Instructions: *Guidance concerning pre-combat checks (PCC), pre-combat inspections (PCI), rehearsals, and/or additional tasks to be accomplished.*

6. Service and Support: *Much of this information should be determined by a unit's standing operating procedures (SOPs). This section can be used for changes or additional information.*

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Class I: *(rations and water)*

Class III: *(petroleum, oil, lubricants [POL])*

Class V: *(ammunition and pyrotechnics)*

Weapon System	Rounds	Type

Pyrotechnic Device	Number	Location

Class VIII: *(medical and combat lifesaver [CLS] supplies)*

Maintenance:

Uniform and equipment common to all:

Appendix B

Convoy Manifest

<p align="center">CONVOY MANIFEST BT 316 (CONVOY NUMBER IF ASSIGNED)</p>						
<p>UNIT: 2nd PLT/ 312th PA Co</p>			<p>DATE: 04 Jan 2004</p>			
<p>CONVOY CDR: SFC Jonny Mumford</p>			<p align="center">Page 1 of 1</p>			
ORDER OF MARCH/INTERNAL CALL SIGN	BUMPER NUMBER	CONVOY PERSONNEL Rank, Last Name, First Name	ASSIGNED TASKS	KEY WEAPONS	COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS	
TRUCK - 1	H4	SPC Hogdon, Don	Lead Gun Truck	M16	Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)	
		PVT Lawrence, Gary		M249	Hand Held	
		SPC Elswick, Gary		M16		
TRUCK - 2	HQ 35	SGT Anthony, Steve	Lead Vehicle CDR	M16	SINCGARS/Mobile Tracking Station (MTS)	
		SPC Beard, Kim		M16	Hand Held	
TRUCK - 3	HQ 14	SPC Acton, Curtis		M16	Hand Held	
		PVT Cook, Bridget		M249		

Appendix C

Convoy Time Schedule

A realistic schedule that uses all of the time available from publishing of the warning order (WARNO) to start point (SP) time is essential to proper convoy planning and preparation. All preparatory tasks are listed with the responsible individual(s) assigned. Generally PCC/PCI and individual vehicle rehearsals are scheduled immediately following the WARNO. The convoy brief is scheduled to be completed leaving 2/3 of time available for convoy preparation ("1/3 / 2/3 rule"). Rehearsals of the entire convoy follow the convoy brief with sufficient time scheduled for practice of designated collective drills. Logistic preparations are scheduled around these essential tasks.

Time Schedule			
When	What	Where	Who
1800	Issue the WARNO	Tent	All
1830	Stage vehicles (VEH)	VEH line	Drivers/Truck commanders (TCs)
1900	PCC/PCI/Individual crew drill rehearsed	VEH line	All
2100	Convoy brief	Tent	All
2200	TCs report PCC/PCI status to assistant convoy commander	VEH line	All
	Rest plan in effect	Assembly area (AA)	All
0400	Wake up/Chow/Personal hygiene	AA	All
0500	Specialty team rehearsals	VEH line	All
0600	Battle drill walk through rehearsal	VEH line	All
0700	Mounted rehearsal	QT937185	All
1130	Final preparations, safety brief, move to SP	QT937185	All
1200	SP	QT937185	All

Appendix D

Pre-Combat Checks (PCC) and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCI)

PCC determine if equipment required for a mission is available and serviceable. PCC are effective only if they are organized and conducted using an up-to-date checklist. This appendix provides suggested checklists for leaders, specialty teams, and individuals. Each unit should use these example checklists as guidelines. The type of unit, equipment, operational area, and mission will dictate additions, substitutions, and deletions. Follow-through is essential; missing or unserviceable equipment must be rapidly reported, repaired, or exchanged. These checks should be scheduled soon after the warning order (WARNO) is issued and after individuals are released from other duties. Individual truck commanders are part of the convoy chain of command and must be held responsible for PCC on their vehicles if time schedules are to be met.

PCI are a series of inspections scheduled early in the preparation sequence to ensure that all PCC have been performed properly and that all vehicles, weapons, communications, and special and individual equipment are available and functional. These PCI are most effective when organized and conducted to exacting standards by first line supervisors, with systematic spot checks made by the convoy's senior leadership. An effective technique is to conduct full PCC/PCI in the convoy recovery period to ensure that individual and unit equipment is immediately ready for the next convoy.

Individual Checklist

Item	Inspection	Remarks
___ Weapon	Cleaned, function check, lubricated	
___ Magazines/Ammunition	Cleaned, serviceable, tracer mix correct	
___ Kevlar	Serviceable, night vision goggle (NVG) ready	
___ Fragment vest/Body armor	Cleaned, serviceable, plates installed	
___ Notebook/Writing device		
___ Eye protection device	Cleaned, serviceable, worn per standing operating procedure (SOP)	
___ Load bearing equipment (LBE) /Load bearing vest (LBV)	Cleaned, serviceable, configured per SOP	
___ First aid pouch	Equipped with 2 first aid dressings	
___ Military/Required IDs	Worn, stored per SOP	
___ Flashlight	Tested, extra bulb	
___ ID tags (dog tags)	Worn per SOP	

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

___	Driver licenses (required)	Current, stored per SOP
___	NVGs with batteries	Cleaned, serviceable, configured per SOP
___	Operators vehicle maintenance (OVM)/Vehicle keys	Serviceable, checked, stored per SOP
___	Sleeping bag/Roll	Serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Sets of desert camouflage uniforms (DCUs) complete	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Brown T-shirts	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Under garments	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Socks (pair)	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Towel and wash cloth	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Personal hygiene kit	Inventory, stored per SOP
___	Joint service lightweight integrated suit technology (JLIST)/Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) complete	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Wet weather gear	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Weapon cleaning kit/Lube	Serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Meals ready to eat (MREs)	Stored per SOP
___	Gortex complete	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Polypro complete	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Work/Cold weather gloves	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
___	Combat lifesaver bag	Inventory, stored per unit SOP
___	Binoculars	Cleaned, serviceable
___	Litter (body bags, cots)	1 per 10 personnel, cots fully set-up and stored

Vehicle/Operator Checklist

Item	Inspection	Remarks
___	Form 5988E (before preventive maintenance checks and services [PMCS])	Are there any issues?
___	Vehicle dispatch	Expiration date?

CONVOY LEADER HANDBOOK

—	Fuel/Fluids	Topped off, any that were unusually low?
—	Additional petroleum, oil, lubricant (POL) products	Inventory, stored per SOP
—	Basic issue items (BII)	Inventory, serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Fire extinguisher	Correct model/size, serviceable
—	Tow bar	Serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Pyrotechnics	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Road guard vest/Belt	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Vehicle flashlight	Tested, extra bulb
—	Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) format	Updated, stored per SOP
—	Convoy strip map(s)	Current mission, stored per SOP
—	Convoy execution matrix(s)	Current mission, stored per SOP
—	Vehicle window(s)/Mirror(s)	Cleaned, serviceable
—	Cargo strap(s)/Load(s)	Serviceable, secure, stored per SOP
—	Warning triangles	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Litter(s)/Body bag(s)	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Hasty recover system(s)	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Case intravenous (I.V.) solution	Expiration date? Stored per SOP
—	Ammunition	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Communication	Cleaned, check(s), correct frequency
—	Case MRE	Serviceable, stored per SOP
—	Case water	Serviceable, stored per SOP

Landing Zone Kit (stored in each key leader vehicle)

Item	Inspection	Remarks
— 2 Smokes	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP	Day far recognition marker
— 1 VS-17 panel	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP	Day near recognition marker

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

___	2 Star Clusters	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP	Night far recognition marker
___	Swinging chem light set-up	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP	Night near recognition marker
___	Gloves	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP	Each team member
___	Goggles	Cleaned, serviceable, stored per SOP	Each team member

Leader Checklist

Item	Inspection	Remarks
___ Binoculars	Cleaned, serviceable	
___ Global Positioning System (GPS)/ mobile tracking station (MTS)/Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2)	Cleaned, serviceable, checked	
___ Convoy brief		
___ Strip map/Execution matrix	Additional copies	
___ Leader book/Writing device		
___ Mission coordination checklist	Updated, all phases of mission	
___ Map (area of operation)	Current graphics (units/intelligence)	
___ Units/Frequencies	Updated, all phases of mission	
___ Current intelligence brief	Updated, focus first phase of mission	
___ Risk management	Reviewed, approved by higher	
___ Standard operating instructions (SOI)/automated network control device (ANCD)	Current, checked	

Appendix E

Strip Map

A strip map is a valuable tool and should be issued to all vehicle commanders in a convoy. It provides an easily used navigational aid, route control measures, and battle tracking information (use of grid coordinates and kilometers between locations), operational and logistical support points, major terrain features, key built up areas, highway infrastructure, danger areas, and enemy “hot spots.” Although a strip map maybe generated at a higher command level, to maximize their utility, companies have the capability and the primary responsibility to generate and update these products with information obtained locally. When available, use Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) as strip maps for the convoy. For vehicles that do not have this asset, hard copies should be reproduced.

Essential Elements of Strip Maps

1. Control Measures.

- Start point (SP)/Release point (RP)
- Check points
- Traffic control points (TCPs)
- Military facilities
- Quick reaction forces (QRF)

2. Danger Areas

- Restricted terrain
- Built up areas
- Bridges/Overpasses

3. Threat Information

- Hot spots on route (multiple contacts in an area in last 60 days)
- Current intelligence on routes (contacts in the last 72 hours)




Figure E-1

Appendix F

Convoy Brief

Movement Order No. _____

References:

A. _____ (Maps, tables, and relevant documents)

B. _____

TASK ORGANIZATION: (Internal organization for convoy [manifest])

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy forces:

(1) Weather (general forecast)

(2) Light data (end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), % illumination, moon rise (MR), moon set (MS), beginning morning nautical twilight [BMNT])

(3) Discuss enemy: (See "Discussing the Threat" in Chapter 2)

(a) Identification of enemy (if known).

(b) Composition/capabilities/strength/equipment

(c) Location ("hot spots" highlighted on map)

(d) Enemy contacts on the route in the last 72 hours

b. Friendly forces:

(1) Operational support provided by higher headquarters:

(a) Helicopter/Gun ships

(b) Quick reaction forces (QRFs)

(c) Military police (MP) escorts/rat patrols

(d) Fire support elements

Element	Location	Frequency/Call Sign

c. Attachments: (Elements assigned to the convoy from outside the organization)

2. MISSION: (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY)

3. EXECUTION:

a. Commander's intent:

b. Concept of movement: This paragraph describes, in general terms, the big picture from start to finish.

c. Tasks to subordinate units (manifest): Includes attached or operational control (OPCON) elements.

d. Coordinating instructions: (instructions for ALL units)

(1) Order of march (spacing of serials and location of support elements).

(2) Routes. (Strip map displayed separately, includes start point (SP), load points, checkpoints, rally points, refuel points, mandatory halts, remain overnight [RONs], traffic control points. Mileage to each should be indicated.)

(3) Additional movement issues (speed, intervals, lane, parking, accidents)

(4) Uniform

(5) Actions at danger/hazard areas (standing operating procedures [SOPs] or battle drills to be rehearsed)

(6) Rules of engagement

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: This paragraph provides the critical logistical information required to sustain the convoy during the operation. Also included are combat service support instructions and arrangements that support the operation.

a. Ration/Water plan:

b. Ammunition (individual/combat loads/tracer mix)

c. Medical (internal treatment/evacuation procedures other than SOP and external procedures/support)

d. Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (internal and external)

d. Maintenance/Recovery (internal and external)

e. RON facilities:

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: This paragraph states where command and control nodes and key leaders will be located during the operation.

a. Commander(s)/Positioning (manifest):

b. Communications (call signs [external traffic] and frequencies):

c. Signals (primary/alternate other than SOP, standard visual [hand and arm] signals are illustrated in Chapter 3)

d. Reports (internal and to higher):

6. SAFETY/RISK MANAGEMENT (emphasize key risks/control measures)

7. REVIEW TIMELINE (displayed separately)

8. GIVE TIME HACK

9. ASK FOR QUESTIONS

10. KEY LEADER CONFIRMATION OR BACKBRIEFS

11. FRAGOs FOR LONG HAUL ROUTES (It is not feasible to cover in detail all of the information required to support long haul convoys that involve hundreds of kilometers and RON halts in a single convoy brief. Therefore, it is essential that each leg of an extended convoy be preceded by a FRAGO that would include, as a minimum, a separate strip map, specific intelligence for that portion of the route, and updated information concerning the support units such as military police (MP) or QRF locations/communications.)

Appendix G

Rehearsals

Understanding and practicing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will enhance a convoy's successful reaction to enemy contact. This handbook presents updated information on the threat and convoy reaction techniques at unit level. The drills and TTP described in Chapter 3 should be briefed and rehearsed by units on a continuous basis. There is rarely enough time during a convoy preparation cycle to ensure that these reaction drills are fully understood by everyone assigned to a convoy. Well-planned rehearsals are a critical aspect of preparation for any combat operation. With limited time, rehearsals must concentrate on battle drill reactions to the most likely threat.

Rehearsals ensure:

- That everyone in the convoy understands and demonstrates a capability to execute the plan and essential drills.
- Misunderstandings/disconnects concerning execution of the drills are discovered and corrected.
- All assets within the convoy and planned potential support from other combat elements in the area of operation (AO) are fully integrated.
- That tactical risks are mitigated, situational awareness is enhanced, and safety procedures are practiced.
- That confidence is instilled within Soldiers that they and their convoy are fully prepared for combat.

Good rehearsals happen only if they are carefully planned and prepared. Each vehicle commander must supervise individual and crew drills for everyone assigned to the convoy. These drill rehearsals should be decentralized, but must be scheduled early in the preparation cycle. Linking these individual and crew rehearsals with pre-combat checks (PCC)/pre-combat inspections (PCI) is an effective technique to employ. The convoy commander should select the most knowledgeable noncommissioned officer (NCO) within the convoy to conduct final collective rehearsals. If time permits, both walk-through (rock drills) and mounted rehearsals with vehicles lined up in convoy movement order should be conducted. During all rehearsals, on-the-spot corrections should be made. Each drill should be practiced until individuals, teams, and crews execute to standard.

Appendix H

Law Of War/Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Rules For Use Of Force

The following Law of War (LOW) guidance has been extracted from the 1st Armored Division regulations for operations in the Baghdad sector of Iraq. It is provided as a guide.

Task: To understand the LOW and its application to coalition force actions.

Condition: Classroom instruction to be applied in all coalition force operations.

Standard: Conduct all operations within requirements of domestic and international law.

Purpose.

- Ensure that all personnel know LOW.
- Ensure that all operations comply with the LOW.
- Be able to distinguish between LOW and rules of engagement (ROE).

Sources of the LOW

- The Hague Conventions
- The Geneva Conventions
- The Geneva Protocols
- Weapon treaties

LOW versus ROE:

- **LOW.** General legal obligations or requirements for all military operations worldwide.
- **ROE.** Mission specific orders that ensure compliance with LOW and provide a framework for achieving national policy goals.

Why Comply with LOW?

- Compliance may end conflict faster
- Violations will decrease public support
- Encourages enemy to comply
- Reduces waste and costs of rebuilding
- Required by law

Lawful Combatants

- Engage in hostilities as party to conflict
- Wear uniform, under command, armed
- Lawful targets unless “out of combat” (sick, wounded, surrendering, prisoners)
- Receive protections of LOW
- UNLAWFUL combatants can be treated as criminals (spies, civilian fighting)

Non-Combatants

- Civilians
- Prisoners
- Wounded and sick
- Medical personnel
- Chaplains
- Journalists

General Principles of LOW

- Military necessity
- Valid military objectives that by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to a military action.
- Destruction, capture, or neutralization of the military objective must offer a direct military advantage to coalition forces.
- Humanity (humane treatment of all personnel)
- No unnecessary injury to people
- No unnecessary damage to property
- Proportionality (limiting reactions to those which are proportional to the offensive action)
- Incidental loss of life and damage to property (collateral damage) must not be excessive in relation to the expected direct military advantage to be gained.
- Discrimination (being discriminate when choosing legal combatants)
- Distinguish between hostile actors and innocent civilians
- Distinguish between valid objectives and protected people and protected places

Forbidden Tactics

- Pretend to surrender or conceal attack
- Wear the Red Cross or Crescent when not performing medical duties
- Cause destruction beyond that required
- Fight in enemy uniform/civilian clothes

Protected Places (Avoid damage to these places unless they are being used for unauthorized purposes!)

- Private property
- Hospitals
- Mosques/Churches
- Schools
- Museums
- Monuments/Historical sites
- Charities

Prevent and Report Violations

- Avoid committing a LOW violation
- Prevent all LOW violations
- Report LOW violations to headquarters
- LOW violations may result in criminal punishment

**Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC)
Rules For Use Of Force**

(Note: Nothing in these rules limits your inherent authority and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action to defend yourself, your unit, and other U.S. forces)

1. Hostile Forces: NO forces have been declared hostile.

2. Hostile Actors: You may engage persons who commit hostile acts or show hostile intent with the minimum force necessary to counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to protect U.S. forces.

- Hostile act: An attack or other use of force against U.S. forces or a use of force that directly precludes/impedes the mission/duties of U.S. forces.
- Hostile intent: The threat of imminent use of force against U.S. forces or the threat of force to preclude/impede the mission/duties of U.S. forces.

3. Use of Force: You may use force, up to and including deadly force, against hostile actors:

- In self defense
- In defense of your unit or other U.S. forces
- To prevent the theft, damage, or destruction of firearms, ammunition, explosives, or property designated by your commander as vital to national security. (Protect other property with less than deadly force.)

4. Escalation of Force: When possible, use the following degrees of force against hostile actors:

- SHOUT: Issue verbal warnings to Halt or *QIF* (pronounced “cough”).
- SHOVE: Physically restrain, block access, or detain.
- SHOW: Display your weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.
- SHOOT: Fire your weapon to remove the threat of death/serious bodily injury or to protect designated property.

IF YOU MUST FIRE:

- Fire only aimed shots.
- Fire no more rounds than necessary.
- Fire with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.
- Take reasonable efforts not to destroy property.
- Stop firing as soon as the situation permits.

Note: Warning shots may be authorized by subordinate commanders in specific areas.

5. **Crowds:** Control civilian crowds, mobs, or rioters interfering with U.S. forces with the minimum necessary force. When circumstances permit, attempt the following steps to control crowds:

- Repeated warnings to HALT or *QIF* (pronounced “cough”)
- Show of force, including riot control formation
- Block access or use reasonable force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat

6. **Detainees:** You may stop, detain, search, and disarm persons as required to protect U.S. forces. Detainees will be turned over to the military police or Iraqi police as soon as possible.

7. **Respect:** Treat all persons with respect and dignity.

ROE VIGNETTES SITUATION 1

You and your squad are providing route security. You see a boy with an AK-47 standing beside the road. The boy is aiming the rifle directly at you. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 1

Shoot to kill the boy with aimed shots. He is a legitimate military target since he has committed a hostile act that places you in immediate danger. You may use necessary force, to include deadly force, in self-defense. Report to HQ.

SITUATION 2

You are the gunner in the lead vehicle of a convoy security escort. About 100 meters (m) ahead, you see what appears to be an improvised explosive device (IED) in the road. A man with a wire in his hand runs quickly toward the bushes. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 2

Shoot to kill. The man has displayed hostile intent through an immediate threat likely to result in death or serious bodily injury to others. Move the convoy out of the kill zone. Record details about the incident, including the IED’s location, and report to HQ.

SITUATION 3

After your high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) passes under a pedestrian overpass, you see a man throw a grenade at the HMMWV behind you. The man takes off running. It appears he is heading toward a nearby neighborhood. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 3

Shoot to kill. The man has committed a hostile act. Deadly force is authorized to protect yourself and other Soldiers. Fire aimed shots and use only the amount of rounds necessary to remove the threat. Avoid collateral damage to the nearby neighborhood. Report to HQ.

SITUATION 4

You are traveling in a convoy when an rocket propelled grenade (RPG) hits the lead vehicle. About 100 m away, you see a man running for cover. He is carrying what appears to be an RPG launcher. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 4

Shoot to kill. The man has committed a hostile act. Necessary force, including deadly force, is authorized to remove an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury. Move the convoy out of the kill zone. Render first aid as necessary. Report to HQ.

SITUATION 5

You and your squad are escorting a convoy of humanitarian aid when you see a suspicious vehicle on the west side of the road. As you approach the vehicle, you see two males throw two AK-47s into the vehicle's trunk and drive away. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 5

Do not fire. Although the ROE would allow you to use non-lethal force to detain the men, you should not abandon your primary mission to provide convoy security. Record details about the incident and report to HQ.

SITUATION 6

Your squad is providing security for halted vehicles of a convoy at a rally point. A vehicle stops about 50 m away. Two young men rush toward the convoy formation; one has an AK-47 pointed at the convoy. It appears the men are trying to take the supplies. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 6

The men have shown hostile intent by threatening immediate use of a weapon against the workers. You may use necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, to remove the threat. Avoid collateral damage to innocent civilians and property. Report to HQ.

SITUATION 7

You and your squad are escorting a convoy down a crowded street. You see a person throwing rocks at the vehicle in front of you. The gunner is hit by a rock. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 7

Do not use deadly force since it is disproportionate to the threat (rocks). If the convoy is moving, direct the gunner down into the vehicle, and drive quickly out of the area. However, if the convoy is stationary, pull security and attempt to detain the individual using non-deadly force.

SITUATION 8

You are a truck commander (TC). As your HMMWV travels up the main supply route (MSR), you see a man with an RPG slung over his shoulder. What will the ROE allow you to do?

RESPONSE 8

You should initially train your weapon on the man and shout, "Stop!" ("*Qif!*") Be prepared to use deadly force if the man commits a hostile act or displays hostile intent. Detain the man and seize the RPG. Report incident to HQ.

Appendix I

Risk Management

The asymmetrical battlefield with the potential for threat contact anywhere in the area of responsibility (AOR) requires that the strictest possible force protection measures be planned and executed for any move of any distance. The challenge to prepare a convoy to react effectively and safely is formidable for many reasons:

- Convoys travel in file formation over predictable routes.
- The enemy chooses the point and timing of any attack.
- The primary threat is from vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)/improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are difficult to identify from a moving vehicle.
- Shooting on the move is required from an unstabilized platform.
- Civilians and private property are always present.
- Command and control is difficult because the decision to react and shoot is necessarily decentralized to each vehicle.

These situations constitute high tactical risks that must be mitigated. In combat, the techniques that leaders and Soldiers use to anticipate the threat and mass accurate fires are identical to those that will lower the potential for fratricide and limit civilian casualties or collateral damage. **Therefore, the measures of risk reduction that are effective in combat must be techniques learned and practiced in training.** These measures are found in *AR 385-63, Policies and Procedures for Firing Ammunition for Training, Target Practice, and Combat*, 15 October 1983. Additional administrative or restrictive rules introduced into training events do not make live-fire exercises safer, they just make them less realistic.

Live-fire training for Soldiers should be performed in a crawl, walk, run sequence with full participation of the chain-of-command. Extensive dry fire practice prior to moving to the range must be performed. Close quarters marksmanship (CQM) with Soldiers shooting during forward, rearward, and lateral movement is an essential training step before executing a convoy live-fire exercise. During CQM, Soldiers effectively learn close range shooting techniques, muzzle awareness, and trigger/selecter manipulation.

Follow-on convoy live-fire scenarios should be designed to be as realistic as possible based on AR 385-63. Enemy targets should be arrayed replicating the threat within engagement areas constructed with buildings or facades, stripped down vehicles, and civilian personnel. Targets should be built of wood or plastic to minimize the risk of ricochet. Metal objects, such as cars and lifters, are carefully bermed or dug in to further reduce the hazard and to protect the target lifters and other devices. All surface area danger diagrams (SDADs) must be carefully checked and deconflicted with those of other ranges or training events within the training area. These SDADs can be transparent to the Soldiers by careful target placement insuring that fires are directed into safe areas and negating the need for administrative right and left range markers.

Live-fire exercises developed in this manner create conditions where troop leading procedures used in combat will result in improved situational awareness, more effective reaction to the threat, and a negligible risk of training accidents.

- Know the enemy. Historical data concerning the threat along scheduled routes are analyzed and disseminated to every Soldier with corresponding instructions for avoiding or countering specific threats.
- PCC/ PCI conducted early in the preparation sequence using a detailed checklist for individuals, vehicles, weapons, communications, and special equipment supervised by the chain-of-command.
- Issuing a detailed convoy brief that emphasizes operational procedures and control measures to focus/deconflict fires and enhance safe engagements.
- Standard drills developed from extensive operational experience are practiced until perfected in rock drills and full rehearsals.

Junior leaders will take away from this training the importance of planning, inspecting, and rehearsing before each tactical convoy. Troop leading procedures and drills learned during the training regimen are a sound platform on which to build a unit standing operating procedure (SOP) or to modify their existing SOP. Soldiers gain confidence not only in themselves and their equipment, but also in the leadership and the unit as a whole. The combined effect is a unit's ability to conduct tactical convoy operations in a hostile environment fully prepared to engage the enemy with a significant reduction of tactical risk.

CONVOY LEADER TRAINING

Convoy Risk Management Card

Planning

Guidance	Preparation Time		
	Optimum	Adequate	Minimal
Hey You	3	4	5
FRAGO	2	3	4
OPORD	1	2	3

Score _____

Intelligence

Overall Threat	Current Route Intelligence			
	>12 Hours	>24 Hours	Historical	None
Level 2	3	4	5	
Level 1	2	3	4	
Random	1	2	3	

Score _____

Communication

Overall Threat	Type of Systems		
	MTS/DTRAK 2-10 SINCGAR	2-10 SINCGAR	>2-10 SINCGAR
Level 2	3	4	5
Level 1	2	3	4
Random	1	2	3

Score _____

Training

Overall Threat	Current Status		
	75% CQM/CSS LFX	75% Weapon Quality	>75% Not Trained
Level 2	3	4	5
Level 1	2	3	4
Random	1	2	3

Score _____

Soldier Endurance

Rest in last 24 hours	Length of Operation			
	1-2 Hours	3-5 Hours	6-8 Hours	9+ Hours
>6 Hours	2	3	4	5
6+ Hours	1	2	3	4

Score _____

Security

Overall Threat	Security (WPN) Support Provided			
	External	1-8 Gun Truck	1-8 Automatic	M16 Only
Level 2	3	4	5	5
Level 1	2	3	4	5
Random	1	2	3	4

Score _____

Personnel Protection

Overall Threat	Hardening/Equipment			
	S/B Hardening FRAG Vest	B Hardening FRAG Vest	FRAG Vest	None
Level 2	3	4	5	5
Level 1	2	3	4	5
Random	1	2	3	4

Score _____

Visibility

Overall Threat	Weather/Light			
	Clear/Day	Dusty/Day	Sandstorm/Day	Night
Desert/Iraq	2	3	4	5

Score _____

SOPs/Rehearsals

Overall Threat	Preparation		
	SOP/Rehearsed Key Actions	SOPs No Rehearsals	No SOP No Rehearsals
Level 2	3	4	5
Level 1	2	3	4
Random	1	2	3

Score _____

Approval Level: 0-19 20-30 31-39 40+
 Low Risk Medium High Risk Very High
 SQD LDR PLT LDR CO CDR BN CDR

Total _____

Note: If 2 or more areas are assigned risk factors of 5 or more, the overall risk is considered "high". Add 3 points to the total for hazardous or sensitive items cargo.

Company Commander's Signature _____ Date _____

This card is prepared by the company commander and then briefed to the convoy commander at receipt of mission. The convoy commander will backbrief the company commander if any established control measures cannot be accomplished

CONVOY TACTICAL RISK REDUCTION WORKSHEET

Check all that apply	Hazard	Risk Level L/M/H	Control Measures	Residual Risk L/M/H
	Adverse terrain		Drivers training, convoy brief	
	Air attack		Convoy defense, battle drills, harden vehicles, communication (commo)	
	Ambush		Convoy defense, battle drills, harden vehicles	
	Barricades		Convoy defense, rehearsals, battle drills, breach teams	
	Blackout drive		Drivers training, convoy brief	
	Break down		Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), PCI, Class II, strip map (SOPs)	
	Exhaust fumes		Enforce no sleep rule, truck commanders (TCs), PMCS, PCI	
	Cargo, hazardous material (HAZMAT)		Training, PCI	
	Civilians		Commo, convoy briefs, training	
	Cold weather		Cold weather training, PCI	
	Communication		Training, commo, personnel, PMCS, PCI	
	Desert environment		Training, convoy briefs	
	Disorientation		Convoy briefs, strip map (SOPs), training Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) Receivers (PLGRs), etc.	

CONVOY LEADER TRAINING

	Driver inexperience		Driver placement, training	
	Enemy attack		Rehearsals, battle drills, convoy briefs, harden vehicles	
	Fratricide		VS-17 panels on vehicles, markings, commo	
	Halt		Rehearsals, battle drills, convoy briefs	
	Heat		Water, rest halts, convoy brief (safety)	
	Heavy rain		PMCS, drivers training, reduce speed	
	Limited visibility		Night vision goggles (NVGs), chem light markings, training	
	Long hauls		Drivers training, SOPs, rest halts, convoy briefs	
	Minefield		Rehearsals, battle drills	
	Mud		Recovery training, drivers training (all wheel drive)	
	Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) attack		Rehearsals, PCI, reconnaissance (recon), commo, training (NBC teams)	
	Recovery operations		Training (with maintenance, self recovery (wrench, tow-bar)	
	Reduced visibility		Intervals, chem light markings, training	
	Roll over		Drivers training, recovery, SOPs (seatbelts, Kevlars)	
	Sleep deprivation		Enforce sleep plan, rest stops, work rotations	
	Sniper fire		Battle drills, convoy briefs, training	

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

	Snow/Ice		Reduce speed, drivers training (use of Combat Terrain Information System [CTIS])	
	Strong winds		Reduce speed, drivers training, convoy briefs	
	Sudden halt		Intervals, training, battle drills (SOPs)	
	Sunlight		Clean windows, sunglasses	
	Fire		Fire extinguishers, evacuation drills	

Appendix J

Close Quarters Marksmanship

The purpose of close quarters marksmanship (CQM) training is to ensure all leaders and Soldiers are familiar with and confident in the use of their individual weapon. CQM has the following goals:

- To provide individuals with the skills necessary to accurately acquire, identify, and engage hostiles while stationary or moving.
- To make the individual Soldier more capable and confident in his/her abilities and the abilities of his/her individual weapon system.
- To develop Soldier confidence in his/her peers and leadership.
- To develop the “warrior” mentality in the individual Soldier.

CQM training is accomplished through the following blocks of instruction:

1. Equipment

Leaders and Soldiers are instructed on how their equipment should be worn. Specifically, individual equipment should be streamlined. There should be nothing on the firing side shoulder, thereby permitting a solid butt stock-to-shoulder weld when firing. Only essential equipment should be carried, thereby minimizing the individual load. The equipment carried should be placed in such a way that the Soldier is able to sit in his vehicle for extended periods of time with minimal discomfort. The mentality should be that if the individual must exit the vehicle while under fire, all essential equipment (both combat and survival/aid) must exit with him/her; never assume a return trip to the vehicle will be available.

2. Weapons Handling

All weapons are treated as loaded at all times! Weapons must be carried in a safe manner. There is no “up and down range” in a combat zone; therefore, the recommended carry posture is the low ready. The proper procedures for loading, clearing, and reducing malfunctions are covered, since these tasks are often improperly executed. Muzzle awareness is stressed, since anything the muzzle crosses can be destroyed. The M16/M4/M249 is a two-handed weapon system; the firing hand is placed with the trigger finger off the trigger and the thumb rests on the selector switch. The non-firing hand remains on the forearm assembly thereby enforcing muzzle awareness.

3. Fundamentals of Marksmanship

Leaders and Soldiers are given instruction on the following eight fundamentals of marksmanship and how they apply to CQM.

- **Stance:** Stance is the most important fundamental since it affects all other aspects of CQM. The stance is achieved by placing the feet shoulder width apart, the non-firing foot slightly forward of the firing foot, toes pointed at the threat while stationary or in the direction of travel while moving, knees slightly bent, and a slight forward lean at the waist.

- **Grip:** The weapon is gripped high on the pistol grip, the firing finger on the outside of the trigger guard, thumb on the selector lever, and non-firing hand on the hand guard applying rearward pressure. The firing hand should remain as relaxed as possible to ensure a smooth trigger squeeze. Elbows stay tight to the body to minimize the individual silhouette and to provide a stable firing platform. The weapon is held in the low ready position until actually ready to engage a threat. This position is achieved by keeping the butt stock tight into the pocket of the shoulder, with the muzzle of the weapon dipped at approximately a 45-degree angle.
- **Breathing:** Breathing affects shot placement up and down. Most targets are larger up and down; therefore, breathing is not as critical as trigger squeeze. However, the individuals must control his breathing during the stresses of an engagement in order to take an accurate shot.
- **Trigger squeeze:** Trigger squeeze affects shot placement left and right. Most targets are smaller left-to-right; therefore, a consistent trigger squeeze is critical. The portion of the finger used to pull the trigger is not as important as maintaining a consistent trigger squeeze. All threats are engaged with a “controlled pair.” This technique is accomplished by taking three sight pictures, one for each shot and a third to emphasize firing until the threat is eliminated.
- **Sight alignment:** Sight alignment is the relationship of the rear sight aperture and the front sight post. There are four methods for aiming when using iron sights (see paragraph 4 below). The rear sight aperture should be set to the large peep for faster target acquisition.
- **Sight picture:** Sight picture is the point of aim on the target. Due to the close range of CQM, the point of impact will be lower than the point of aim. Therefore, individuals must aim slightly higher in order to achieve an incapacitating shot. The recommended point of aim for 25 meters and closer is the clavicle notch of the neck.
- **Recovery:** Recovery involves the techniques applied by the individual to minimize the effects of recoil and includes the stance, as well as the grip of the weapon. The goal of recovery is to reduce muzzle climb, thereby achieving a faster second shot.
- **Follow through:** Follow through begins at the end of recovery and involves the techniques applied to reacquire the threat for the second and subsequent shots. At the end of recovery the individual should be looking down their sights at the threat and squeezing the trigger for the next shot.

4. Aiming With Iron Sights

There are four methods of aiming with iron sights:

- **Slow-aimed fire:** Slow-aimed fire is used when accuracy is more important than speed and involves seeking perfect sight alignment and sight picture. Slow-aimed fire is very accurate but too slow for the

purposes of CQM (<300).

- **Rapid-aimed fire:** Rapid-aimed fire involves imperfect sight alignment and emphasizes windage not elevation for sight picture. Rapid-aimed fire is slightly faster and less accurate than slow-aimed fire (< 100m).
- **Aimed quick-kill:** Aimed quick-kill involves placing the top of the front sight post even with the top of the rear sight aperture and emphasis is placed on windage not elevation for sight picture. This method is much faster and less accurate than slow-aimed fire (< 25m).
- **Instinctive fire:** In the instinctive fire method, the sights are not used. The individual looks at the target and relies on muscle memory for shot placement. This method is very fast but inaccurate (< 15m). The current allocation of time and ammunition does not permit the development of the muscle memory required to utilize this method of aiming, emphasis is placed on rapid-aimed fire and aimed quick-kill.

5. CQM Practical Exercise

- Dry fire exercise:
 - Individuals are shown the various firing positions while stationary and while moving.
 - Training is conducted on a 25-meter range, with firing lines designated at 4 meters, 7 meters, 10 meters, 15 meters, 20 meters, and 25 meters.
 - As this is the beginning of the development of muscle memory, multiple repetitions of each movement are used until everyone shows proficiency.
 - Three commands are used during this portion of training: ready, up, and recover.

On the command "Ready," the individuals look at and identify their target.

On the command "Up," the individuals face their target (if necessary), raise their weapons from the low ready to the ready position simultaneously rotating their selector switch from safe to semi, and simulate firing a controlled pair.

On the command "Recover," the individuals rotate their weapons back to safe and return to the start position, lowering their weapon back to the low ready position.

- The following are the positions and movements:

Target to the front

Target to the rear

Target to the left

Target to the right

Walking away from the target (stop-turn-shoot)

Walking laterally to the target (left-to-right, right-to-left)

Walking towards the target (walk-stop-shoot)

Running towards the target (run-stop-shoot)

When turning to face the target is necessary, the individual will pivot on the ball of the foot closest to the threat (target).

- CQM live fire: Individuals display their comprehension of the previous blocks of instruction by accurately engaging their target with a controlled pair. Only the available ammunition limits the number of controlled pairs for each position or movement. Sixty rounds (three controlled pairs per position) should be considered the minimum to ensure complete comprehension. The following table is a suggested course of fire:

Firing Position	Distance
Target front (stationary)	4 meters
Target left (stationary)	7 meters
Target right (stationary)	10 meters
Target rear (walk-stop-turn)	Start at 4 meters, stop and turn at 7 meters
Target front (walk-stop-shoot)	Start at 7 meters, stop at 4 meters
Target front (walk-stop-shoot)	Start at 15 meters, stop at 10 meters
Target front (run-stop-shoot)	Start at 20 meters, stop at 10 meters
Target front (stationary)	25 meters
Target left (walk laterally)	Move left-to-right at 7 meter line
Target right (walk laterally)	Move right-to-left at 7 meter line

6. Crew-served Weapons Training

Soldiers and leaders must be instructed on the proper and safe procedures for using both their individual weapon and the crew-served weapons assigned to the unit (M249, M240B, M2HB .50 cal and the MK19). Training is given in three blocks.

- The first block covers clearing, disassembly, maintenance, reassembly, and functions check.
- The second block includes loading, firing, reducing stoppage, and unloading procedures, as well as reacting to fire commands while ground mounted.
- The third block covers the peculiar requirements for engaging from a vehicle.

All blocks of instruction are followed by a practical exercise (dry fire and live fire). The major firing tasks for the crew-served weapons will be to fire from a stationary (ground) supported position, fire from a stationary vehicle, and fire from a moving vehicle.

Throughout all of this instruction and firing, safety will be paramount. Safe handling of weapons, manipulation of weapon's safety, reacting to fire commands, and muzzle awareness will be reinforced.

7. Setting Up a CQM Range.

A CQM can be set up anywhere that offers 25 meters of clear fire and either a catch berm or line of fire into an impact area:

- A typical platoon lane includes seven target frames of six targets each, which allows for a platoon to fire on a lane.
- Sandbags are used to separate frames and to delineate distances.
- Training is conducted using type-E silhouettes mounted on frames of six each.
- A standard M16/M4 25-meter zero target is placed on the E-type with the top of the paper even with the “shoulders” of the E-type and center mass. This allows confirmation of zero before CQM instruction; then the silhouette on the zero target acts as the point of aim for CQM firing.
- Each shooter should dry fire practice each of the moves to develop muscle memory prior to firing. Although individuals will grasp the CQM concepts at different rates, maximum time should be allotted for dry fire exercises.
- Sixty rounds dispersed among the ten firing positions should be considered the minimum for familiarization to CQM.
- Due to the short range, the shooter should see his rounds strike near the bottom of the zero target. This is rectified in the “real world” by aiming slightly higher to compensate. However, changing the point of aim during training is discouraged so that consistency can be achieved.




Figure App K-1

Appendix K

3-Day Convoy Live Fire Exercise Time-Line

	Time	Who	What
Day Zero	1600	All	Units arrives on Range 7A and receives in-brief.
	1800 – 2000	Leaders	Convoy organization and battle drills
Day One	0600 – 1300	All	Close quarters marksmanship (CQM), crew-served weapon (CSW) and left/right side stationary shoot
	1300 – 1500	Leaders	Troop leading procedures (TLPs)
	1500 – 1700	Leaders	Mounted rehearsals
	1700 – UTC	Leader	Mission preparation for leader’s run
	1300 – 1700	Soldiers	Collective training tasks (CTT), reporting, and first aid
	1800	All	Issue warning order (WARNO)
Day Two	0600 – 0800	Leaders	Mounted rehearsals
	0800 – 0930	Leaders	Dry run, wet run, and after action review (AAR)
	0600 – 1000	Soldiers	Battle drills, talk-through, and walk-through
	1100 – UTC	All	Issue operations order (OPORD)/convoy brief and unit mission preparation
Day Three	0500 – 0930	All	Mounted rehearsals
	0930 – UTC	All	Dry run, wet, run and AAR

Unit Requirements For Convoy Live Fire Exercise (CLFX) Training

Day prior to any LFX execution for your unit:

- Task-organize platoons. Convoys will not exceed a maximum of 15 vehicles for the CLFX.
- Identify officer-in-charge (OIC) and range safety officer (RSO) per range: name, rank, and last four digits of Social Security number (SSN) will be required. Range brief is conducted by Range Control 6498456 at _____.
- Range safety brief conducted for all personnel.
- Arrive at range 1600 hours the night prior to firing. Provide the OIC and RSO data to training cadre and have guards present for briefing.
- Range requirements for the CLFX are one certified OIC and RSO with vehicle and radio; two medics/combat life savers (CLSs) with litter capable vehicle, litter, aid bag, strip map to nearest medical facility and sufficient guards with vehicles and Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) to block the range (See "Range Control Regulations")
- The leader for the guard force will conduct a radio check using single channel plain text.
- Desert camouflage uniform (DCU) and headgear, with weapon and ammunition, is the uniform for training. When on any range or executing a convoy on LFX lanes, Kevlar helmet and flak-vest are required.
- Any person missing a portion of the training will not be certified. Anyone not attending CQM or weapons training will NOT participate in the CLFX
- Ensure that the ammunition listed below is available for CQM training and CLFX.
- All convoys must have their own assigned vehicles. Convoys will not be permitted to "hot bed" personnel or vehicles in order to limit vehicle requirements. The same vehicles and personnel are required for each portion of planning, preparation, and execution. Units need their own vehicles.
- Units will bivouac at the ranges on arrival day CLFX AA (eight tents available) for sleeping.
- Each serial will provide three leaders, E-6 above, for leader training: convoy commander, assistant convoy commander, lead vehicle commander.
- Contact number for training cadre is _____.


Note: Training area tents may be used for sleeping based on the following guidelines:

- Leader's "teach tent" is OFF LIMITS.
- Tents may be used only after the training cadre establishes that training is complete.
- Eating or use of any tobacco products in any of the tents is strictly prohibited.
- All tents must be vacated and restored to classroom conditions NLT _____.
- Unit leadership is responsible for area police.
- Unit will leave five personnel with vehicle to finalize range clearance.

Violations of any of these guidelines will result in units being delayed from training or clearing.



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